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2ABSTRACT
Managers of buyout funds typically offer their investors an 8% preferred return on 
their investment before they take a share of any additional profits.  Venture capitalists, on 
the other hand, rarely offer a preferred return.  Instead, VCs take their cut from the first 
dollar of nominal profits.  This disparity between venture funds and buyout funds is 
especially striking because the contracts that determine fund organization and 
compensation are otherwise very similar. The missing preferred return might suggest 
that agency costs pose a larger problem in venture capital than previously thought.  Is the 
missing preferred return evidence, perhaps, that VCs are camouflaging rent extraction 
from investors?
This Article argues that the missing preferred return is evidence that venture capital 
compensation practices do not properly align incentives. Making VC pay subject to a 
preferred return would help investors screen out bad VCs and would motivate VC s more 
effectively when they find, court, and negotiate with entrepreneurs.  This positive effect 
that the preferred return may have on “deal flow” incentives may be less important for 
VCs with strong reputations.  Even for elite VCs, however, the status quo appears to be 
inefficient, albeit in a different way.  If a fund declines in value in its early years, as is 
usually the case, the option-like feature of VC pay distorts incentives.  Compensating 
VCs with a percentage of the fund, rather than just a percentage of the profits, would 
eliminate this distortion of incentives.  Thus, the current industry practice is puzzling.  
None of the usual suspects like bargaining power, boardroom culture, camouflaging rent 
extraction or cognitive bias offers an entirely satisfactory explanation.  Only by peering 
into a dark corner of the tax law can we fully understand the status quo. 
The tax law encourages venture capital funds to adopt a compensation design that 
misaligns incentives but still maximizes after-tax income for all parties.  Specifically, by 
not recognizing the receipt of a profits interest in a partnership as compensation, and by 
treating management fees as ordinary income but treating distributions from the carried 
interest as capital gain, the tax law encourages funds to maximize the amount of 
compensation paid in the form of a profits interest.  One way to do this is to eliminate the 
preferred return, thereby increasing the present value of the carried interest, which in turn 
allows investors to pay lower tax-inefficient management fees.  
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4Managers of buyout funds usually offer investors an 8% preferred return on their 
investment before they take a share of any additional profits.  Venture capitalists, on the 
other hand, offer no preferred return.  Instead, VCs take their cut from the first dollar of 
nominal profits.  They offer investors no feature to account for investors’ cost of capital, 
nor do they index their compensation to an industry benchmark.  This disparity between 
venture capital funds and other private equity funds is especially striking because the 
contracts that determine fund organization and compensation are otherwise very similar.  
This Article examines the mystery of this missing preferred return.
The missing preferred return is troubling because it suggests that VCs may 
receive “pay without performance.”1 VCs receive incentive compensation even if their 
funds do poorly when compared to other venture funds, and even when compared to 
other, less risky investments that investors could have made.  This gap between pay and 
performance suggests that agency costs in venture capital are a more stubborn problem 
than previously thought.  In the public equities market, regulators strive to protect small 
investors.  Many laws and regulations, such as the $1,000,000 limit on the deductibility 
of executive pay that is not linked to performance,2 are designed to protect investors who 
may not be able to effectively constrain management from extracting rents.3 In private 
equity, however, the regulatory landscape reflects the conventional wisdom that 
sophisticated investors can look out for themselves.4 The missing preferred return poses 
a challenge to this view.  Are fund managers camouflaging the true value of their 
compensation?  If not, then why would sophisticated investors pay fund managers for 
mediocre work? Unlike the children of Lake Wobegon, not every venture fund is above 
average.5
Take the University of California Retirement System, a prominent institutional 
investor.  More than one in ten venture funds in which the UCRS invested has missed the 
common hurdle rate of 8%, and nearly one in five would have received less 
compensation if the hurdle rate mechanism were used.6 Using a preferred return would 
seem to make a difference.  By leaving out a preferred return term, VC fund agreements
reward mediocrity.  This arrangement hardly seems efficient, let alone fair to retirees 
worried about their pension plan assets.  Are VCs using compensation design to sneakily 
extract rents from their investors, as CEOs are said to do?  
1
 For a discussion of the problem of ineffective executive compensation design in the public company 
context, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE 
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).
2 See I.R.C. § 162(m).
3 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1; Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve 
Been, How We Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them, ECGI Finance Working Paper 
44/2004 (July 2004).
4 See generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.20[2] (4th ed. 2002) 
(discussing definition of accredited investor).  
5 See Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-Ups, 57 TAX L. REV.
142 n.20 (discussing Lake Wobegon effect); Bebchuk & Fried, supra note [xx], at 71-72 (discussing 
ratcheting effect and noting that the vast majority of firms that use peer groups to set compensation set it at 
or above the fiftieth percentile of the peer group).  
6 See UCRS data as of Sept. 30, 2004 (on file with author) (also available at 
http://www.ucop.edu/treasurer/invret/PE%20irr%2093004.pdf)
5This agency costs story starts to feel a little thin, however, when one considers the 
presence of the preferred return in buyout funds.  Investors routinely demand a preferred 
return in buyout funds.  These very same investors then accept its absence in venture 
capital.  With billions of dollars in fees at stake, the missing preferred return cannot be 
the product of greedy managers sneaking one past sleepy investors.  No one is being 
hoodwinked here.  Something else must be going on.  
The secretive pay practices of the private equity world are worth investigating.  
Private equity fund managers, recently dubbed “Capitalism’s New Kings” by the 
Economist magazine, draw hefty management fees from investors, and they cash in on 
even greater amounts by taking a share of the profits of their funds.7  This share of the 
profits is known as the “carry” or “carried interest.”  In contrast to the considerable 
research on CEO pay,8 private equity compensation practices are largely unexplored in 
the legal literature.  Stock options are praised or scorned, but few know enough about the 
carried interest to even have an opinion.  This Article uses the mystery of the missing 
preferred return to take the first hard look at the compensation of private equity fund 
managers.
I argue in this Article that the peculiar workings of the tax law, combined with 
institutional differences between venture capital and buyout funds, best explain the 
missing preferred return.  Many VC funds leave out a preferred return because investors 
can rely on the reputation of elite VCs, along with contractual restraints, to ensure that 
VCs find and invest in high-quality portfolio companies.  For VC funds that may be 
inclined to use a preferred return, the tax law changes the cost-benefit analysis and 
discourages the use of the preferred return.  Institutional differences make the preferred 
return more valuable as a device for aligning incentives in buyout funds, and thus it is 
employed more widely in buyout funds, notwithstanding the tax cost.  The preferred 
return would be used more widely in venture capital if the tax rules were changed.  If I 
am right about the influence of tax, the implications are somewhat troubling.  The gap 
between the economics of a partnership equity interest and its treatment for tax purposes 
distorts incentives by encouraging fund managers to receive more compensation in the 
form of risky equity rather than cash salary, which in turn may distort the operation of the 
venture capital markets.   The main goal of this Article, however, is descriptive rather 
than normative.  Before we can make informed policy judgments, we must first 
understand how these kings of capitalism are paid, and why. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  In Part II, I explain the basic mechanics of 
private equity compensation.  I then frame the puzzle by looking at recent returns in 
venture capital and considering the importance of the preferred return.  In Part III, I 
report the explanations offered by venture capitalists, investors, and lawyers who draft 
these agreements.  In Part IV, I consider the effect the preferred return may have on the 
incentives of VCs.  The efficiency of a given compensation scheme, I argue, may depend 
on the reputation of the VC.  I conclude, however, that the missing preferred return 
cannot be explained by incentives and reputation alone.  Part V argues that the final piece 
7 See Kings of Capitalism: A Survey of Private Equity, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 2004 (special section).
8 See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS (Orley Ashenfelter 
& David Card eds. 1999), at 1 (“… CEO pay research has grown even faster than CEO paychecks, 
skyrocketing from 1-2 papers per year prior to 1985 to sixty papers in 1995.”).    
6of the puzzle lurks in a dark corner of the tax law:  an IRS administrative pronouncement 
concerning the taxation of a profits interest in a partnership.  I argue that tax encourages 
venture capital funds to adopt a compensation design that misaligns incentives but still 
maximizes after-tax income for all parties.  Part V also returns to the original question –
the disparity between venture funds and buyout funds.  I argue that the differences in the 
kinds of companies buyout funds invest make the preferred return necessary, 
notwithstanding the tax cost.  Part VI concludes.
II.  The Puzzle
I begin with a prediction:  the 21st century will be the golden age of private equity.  
The 20th century marked the rise of the modern public corporation and with it, the
stubborn problem of the separation of ownership and control.9  In the 1980s, the 
leveraged buyout model of firm organization led some scholars to predict the eclipse of 
the public corporation.10  Public firms responded by improving efficiency; among other 
things, they now routinely link pay to performance.11  But pay-for-performance can tempt 
executives to mislead public investors and artificially inflate short-term stock prices.  
More firms are again opting to go private.12 Legal academics, meanwhile, myopically 
focus on the problem of agency costs in public companies.  When academics do refer to 
private equity, most praise the powerful financial incentives provided to managers.13  But 
surely there is more to it.  
Private equity fund managers are playing with other people’s money, just like 
CEOs.  And, as with CEOs, there is some evidence that not all fund managers act like 
saints all of the time.14 Understanding the carried interest may be the key to unlocking 
the problem of agency costs in private equity.  Study of VC compensation began in 
earnest with Bill Sahlman’s 1990 article in the Journal of Financial Economics, The 
Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, where he identified the 
importance of the carried interest and noted that the option-like characteristic of the carry 
9 See ADOLPH BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
10 See Michael C. Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept.-Oct. 1989), p. 61.
The cultural importance of the rise of the LBO model was captured most memorably in BARBARIANS AT 
THE GATE (HBO 1993); see also BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE 
FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990). 
11 The link between pay and performance may be largely cosmetic, however.  See Bebchuk & Fried, supra 
note [xx], at 67-68 (discussing the concept of camouflage). 
12
 See Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes & Xue Wang, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms’ Going-Private 
Decisions (available on ssrn.com) (May 6, 2004) (finding modest increase in going private decisions as a 
result of Sarbanes Oxley).
13 See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1078 (2003).
14 I am indebted to Vic Goldberg for this nifty phrase.  On evidence of agency costs in venture capital,
Marcus Cole and Joe Bankman have written that agency costs led VCs to make bad investments at the end 
of the Internet bubble, when they should have been allowing investors to hold on to their money.  See 
Joseph Bankman & Marcus Cole, The Venture Capital Investment Bust: Did Agency Costs Play a Role? 
Was it Something Lawyers Helped Structure?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211 (2001).  Paul Gompers and Josh 
Lerner identify the problem of “grandstanding,” where VCs take portfolio companies public prematurely to 
improve future fundraising efforts.  See Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE
(1999), chap. 12.
7could distort incentives.15 Financial economists Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, in their 
highly influential book, The Venture Capital Cycle, argued that establishing reputation 
was an important motivation for new VCs, and that the compensation of established 
funds was more sensitive to performance than that of other funds.16 In recent years 
economists have written literally hundreds of articles about venture capital, though few 
articles examine agency costs at the fund level.17
The legal academy has a long way to go in order even to catch up with financial 
economists. Ron Gilson was the first legal academic to pay close attention to the agency 
costs problem in venture capital.  Gilson noted that the GP’s compensation structure is 
the “front line response to the potential for agency costs” resulting from giving the GP 
control over the fund’s investments.18  But Gilson’s discussion of the carried interest 
stopped short of a detailed examination of carried interest design.19 More recently, Kate 
Litvak has undertaken an ambitious empirical study of venture capital fund agreements.20
Among other things, Litvak argues that the practice of staging capital calls creates an 
option to abandon that helps mitigate agency costs.21  Other developments in private 
equity fund contracting that may address agency costs, such as “no-fault divorce” clauses 
that allow limited partners to fire the general partner, have yet to receive much attention 
by the academy.22 In sum, the legal academy is just coming to the realization, which our 
finance colleagues realized a decade ago or more, that studying private equity can 
provide a useful way to examine the old problem of the separation of ownership and 
control.  Private equity gives us a window, relatively free from the distortions of 
securities regulation, to see what sort of private ordering the market can develop on its 
own to address agency costs.  And while I conclude in this Article that private ordering 
fails to properly align incentives, the distortion here is not caused by collective action 
problems, boardroom culture, camouflaged compensation, or accounting rules.  Instead, 
15 See William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. Fin. 
Econ. 473, 494-499 (1990).
16 See Gompers & Lerner, supra note [xx]. at 81. Litvak’s research undermines some of Gompers & 
Lerner’s key findings.  See Litvak, Understanding Compensation Arrangements, supra note xx, at pin.
17
 An SSRN search for the term “venture capital” in the title or abstract generated 500 hits; a search for 
“venture capital” in the title only generated 199 hits.  See ssrn.com (site last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
18 See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons From The American Experience, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1089 (2003). See also David Rosenberg, The Two “Cycles” of Venture Capital, 28 
J. CORP. L. 419 (2003); David Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of 
Contract, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363.; Joseph W. Bartlett & W. Eric Swan, Private Equity Funds: 
What Counts and What Doesn’t?, 26 J. CORP. L. 393 (2001) (noting importance of design of carried 
interest).
19 Regarding the design of the carried interest, Gilson noted only that certain adjustments could be made 
after the fact to prevent certain abuses by the GP.  These adjustments are known as a “clawbacks.”  See 
Gilson, supra note [xx]. at [1089]; JAMES M. SCHELL, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND 
OPERATIONS sec 2.04[2] (2000).
20 See Kate Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements: Understanding Compensation 
Arrangements (available on ssrn).
21 See Kate Litvak, The Price of Stability: Default Penalties in Venture Capital Partnership Agreements, 40
WILLAMETTE L. REV. [pin] (2004).   But see Victor Fleischer, Fickle Investors, Reputation, and the 
Clientele Effect in Venture Capital Funds, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. [pin] (2004) (questioning whether 
default penalties are an effective governance device).
22 See David Toll, PRIVATE EQUITY PARTNERSHIP TERMS AND CONDITIONS 62 (2d ed. 2001); WILLIAM M. 
MERCER INC., KEY TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING 42 (1996) (hereinafter “The 
Mercer Report”). 
8the villain is the tax law.  The peculiar tax treatment of a profits interest in a partnership 
encourages parties to keep the status quo, even though some alternative designs might 
better align incentives.  
A.  Venture Capital Funds vs. Buyout Funds
Like the dog that didn’t bark, the missing preferred return is remarkable only in 
context.23  Private equity funds share basic structural qualities even though the underlying 
companies they invest in vary widely.  The private equity market is made up of distinct 
investment partnerships, called funds.  Each fund uses a pre-defined investment strategy 
that focuses on a particular asset class:  investors may choose from buyout funds, 
merchant banking funds, real estate funds, venture capital funds, Asian funds, mezzanine 
funds, and so forth.24  Within each asset class, funds may target particular industries 
within a sector, such as Internet companies, software, biotechnology, or health care start-
ups.25  This Article focuses on a difference in compensation structure in two particular 
types of private equity funds, defined by asset class: venture capital funds and buyout 
funds.  Although I focus on the preferred return in buyout funds, what is true for buyout
funds is also generally true for real estate funds, mezzanine funds, funds of funds, and 
other private equity investments.  When it comes to the preferred return, only venture is 
different.
Basic fund organization is the same for venture funds and buyout funds.  Funds 
are organized as limited partnerships or limited liability companies under state law.  
Investors become limited partners (LPs) in the partnerships and commit capital to the 
fund.  A general partner (GP) manages the partnership in exchange for an annual 
management fee, usually between 1.5 and 3 percent of the fund’s committed capital.  The 
GP also receives a share of any profits; this profit-sharing right is called the “carry” or 
“carried interest.”  The carried interest aims to align the incentives of the GP with those 
of the LPs.  Because the GP can earn significant compensation if the fund performs well, 
the fund managers are driven to work harder and earn profits for the partnership as a 
whole.  The GP also contributes about 1% of the capital to the fund.  This amount, which 
is largely an artifact of tax history, is small in comparison to the carry and generally has a 
negligible effect on incentives.26
23
 See ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, SILVER BLAZE.
“Is there any other point to which you wish to draw my attention?”
“To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”
“That was the curious incident,” remarked Holmes.
24
 The type of fund, in other words, refers to the type of investment rather than who the investors are.
25
 For example, in 2002 venture investments were divided into the following sectors:  Communications 
(including Internet) 24%, Computer Software 20%, Biotechnology 13%, Healthcare Related 11%, 
Computer Hardware and Services, 9%, Semiconductors and Electronics, 7%, Retailing and Media, 7%, 
Business/Financial, 4%, and Industrial/Energy, 4%.  See 2003 NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION 
YEARBOOK (Thomson Venture Economics), at 28.
26 Before the check-the-box rules, a 1% capital interest was necessary to help ensure partnership 
classification for tax purposes.  See Schell, supra note [xx], at § 3.02[2]; Victor E. Fleischer, If It Looks 
Like a Duck: Corporate Resemblance and Check-The-Box Tax Classification, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 518 
(1996).  Some LPs are pushing for increase to 2 or 3%, which may reflect some of the concerns discussed 
infra in the section on deal harvesting incentives.
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After formation, the GP 
deploys the capital in the fund by 
investing in different operating 
businesses, known as portfolio 
companies.  After making the 
initial investment, the GP 
becomes a formal or informal 
advisor to the companies.  In 
most venture funds, the portfolio 
companies are high-tech start-
ups, and the GP’s ultimate goal 
is to take the portfolio companies 
public or sell the companies’ 
stock or assets to another 
company.  In buyout funds, the 
fund makes sizeable investments 
in mature companies.  The fund then might reorganize the company, change its corporate 
strategy, or make aggressive changes in management to improve its operations.  Buyout
funds then eventually sell each portfolio company to a trade buyer, break it up and sell 
off the assets, or take the portfolio company public again, selling shares back to public 
shareholders at a profit.  Lately, with IPO markets cold, buyout funds have increasingly 
looked to sell to other buyout funds as an exit strategy.
Both venture capital funds and buyout funds use the carried interest to create 
powerful economic incentives for the GP.  The GP is itself a partnership or LLC with a 
small number of professionals as members.  The GP receives a management fee that 
covers administrative overhead and pays the managers’ salaries.  The management fee is 
fixed and does not depend on the performance of the fund.  The carry, on the other hand, 
is performance-based.  Because private equity funds are leanly staffed, a carried interest 
worth millions of dollars may be split among just a handful of managers.  For successful 
fund managers, private equity is a lucrative game.
1.  The carry in leveraged buyout funds
In buyout funds, the carried interest is subject to a preferred return requirement 
that works as follows.  Before the GP receives any carry, the LPs first receive a preferred 
return on their investment, often 8%.  The preferred return ensures that LPs receive at 
least as much as they would have made on safer market investments before the GP takes 
a share of the profits.  The mechanics of allocation and distribution of profit and loss in 
partnership agreements are famously intricate and difficult to follow.  While the general 
structure of fund agreements is largely standardized, details in drafting vary, and certain 
terms, like those pertaining to the timing of distributions, are often heavily negotiated.27
Without spelunking too deep into partnership agreement drafting issues, it is worth 
highlighting the basic mechanics of partnership allocation and distribution as they pertain 
to the preferred return.
27 See Bartlett & Swan, supra note [xx].
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Capital accounts track the economic arrangements of partnerships.  Allocation 
provisions increase and decrease capital accounts of individual partners as the partnership 
realizes gains or losses.  Thus, when a fund sells an investment at a profit, each partner 
receives an allocation of profit and its capital account is increased according to the terms 
of the agreement.  Distribution provisions then determine the order each partner receives 
actual distributions of cash or securities.  When there is a gap between allocation and 
distributions, the difference is made up when the fund is liquidated.28  Capital accounts 
thus define the true economic arrangement amongst the partners; timing and credit risk 
issues aside, a partner’s take will ultimately match its capital account.  The partnership 
agreement may be drafted so that the key economic terms are stated in either the 
allocation or distribution provisions; for simplicity here I assume that the allocation 
provisions do the heavy lifting, and that the distributions then follow the allocations.  
An allocation provision with a preferred return could say that as gains are realized 
from partnership investments, allocations will occur as follows:   
 First, 100% to the LPs until such time as the LPs have received back their initial 
contribution of capital, 
 second, 100% to the LPs until they have received an amount equal to 8% return, 
compounded annually, on their initial investment, and
 thereafter, 80% to the LPs and 20% to the GPs.29
Such an arrangement is called a “true” preferred return.  It is also sometimes 
called a “floor,” because the GP receives no carry until reaching the 8% return.
The phrase “hurdle rate,” often used interchangeably with “preferred return” in 
the industry, more accurately describes the actual mechanics of most agreements.30  A 
hurdle rate means that once the GP has returned the initial capital plus an 8% return, it 
has cleared the hurdle and becomes entitled to take the full 20% carry.  To achieve this 
goal, the agreement includes a “catch-up” provision.  A partnership agreement with a 
hurdle rate thus might say that allocations take place as follows:  
 first, 100% to the LPs until the LP has received 100% of its initial capital back, 
28
 Sometimes, there is not enough cash remaining in the partnership to square off the accounts at 
liquidation.  In that case, a clawback provision will be used to ensure that the economics of the partnership 
ultimately match up with the capital accounts.  See infra text accompanying notes [xx].  
29
 A brief numerical example may help.  Suppose the LPs contribute $100 to the partnership, which buys 
stock in a single company, Acme Inc., for $100.  One year later the partnership sells its Acme stock for 
$158.  The first $100 is allocated to the LPs, returning their initial investment in the partnership.  The LPs 
are then allocated $8, representing the preferred return.  $50 remains and is split 80-20, with the LPs 
receiving an allocation of $40 and the GPs receiving an allocation of $10.  The LPs will have capital 
accounts totaling $148 ($100 + $8 + $40) and the GP will have a capital account of $10.  Note that because 
of the preferred return, the GP’s final share of the profits is less than 20% ($10 / $58 = 17.2%).  
30 See Jack S. Levin, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL 
TRANSACTIONS (2004) at § 10-10 (noting that “permanent preferential return” is used less commonly). 
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 second, 100% to the LPs until the LPs have received an amount equal to 8% 
return, compounded annually, on their initial investment, 
 third, 100% to the GP until the GP has “caught up” and received 20% of the 
amount in excess of the initial investment, and 
 thereafter, 80% to the LPs and 20% to the GPs.31
In contrast to a true preferred return, the significance of the hurdle rate vanishes after it is 
cleared.  After the catch-up amount, the GP receives 20% of the total nominal profits of 
the fund, erasing any measure of the LP’s cost of capital.
The compounding of the preferred return rate is what makes it an important 
contract term.  Private equity funds have a life, defined by contract, of 10 to 12 years.  If 
an LP invests $100 in a ten-year fund, an 8% preferred return (compounded annually) 
means that LP must receive $216 before the GP may take any carry.
Complicating matters even further is the fact that, in many partnership 
agreements, the hurdle must only be cleared once.  A fund may invest in as many as ten 
or fifteen portfolio companies, each of which is later sold at a different time.  Many fund 
agreements are structured so that if the GP realizes an investment (i.e. sells a portfolio 
company) or series of investments at a cumulative profit that clears the then-applicable 
hurdle rate, the catch-up provision kicks in and the GP is thereafter entitled to its 20% 
carry, even if—in the long run—the fund’s overall return falls below 8%.  Thus, if a fund 
has one or two early successes at a large profit, and then equal successes and failures 
thereafter, for an overall return of 5%, the GP would receive 1% (20% of the 5%) as
carry.  
Finally, some funds allow GPs to receive carry on a deal-by-deal basis, making a 
“clawback” provision necessary.  A “clawback” provision determines what happens 
when the GP has some early successes, which entitles it to receive carry, but then sees 
later investments fail to show profits.  If the overall return of the fund drops below zero, 
then the GP will incur an obligation to return the amount received as carry to the fund.  
The clawback ensures that the carry is ultimately determined on an aggregate level, rather 
than portfolio company-by-portfolio company.32
31 Suppose the LPs contribute $100 to the partnership, which then buys stock in a single company, Acme 
Inc., for $100.  One year later the partnership sells its Acme stock for $158.  The first $100 is allocated to 
the LPs, returning their initial investment in the partnership.  The LPs are then allocated $8, representing 
the preferred return.  The GP is then allocated $2, representing the catch-up.  $48 remains, and is split 80-
20, with the LPs receiving an allocation of $40.40 and the GP receiving an allocation of $9.60.  The LPs 
will have a capital account of $146.40 and the GP will have a capital account of $11.60.  Note that because 
of the catch up provision, the GP’s final share of the profits, $11.60 / $58, is exactly 20%.
32
 Suppose the LPs invest $100 in a fund, which invests $50 in Beta Inc. and $50 in portfolio company, 
Gamma Inc.  One year later, the Beta stock is sold for $85.  Under the terms of the partnership agreement, 
the first $50 is allocated to the LPs, the next $4 (8% * 50) is allocated to the LPs, the next $1 is allocated to 
the GP (the catch up amount) and the remaining $30 is split $24-$6 between the LPs and the GP.  The GP 
has thus received $7 in carry from the $35 in profits from the sale of Beta stock.  The LPs have received a 
total of $78.  Nine years later, Gamma Inc. files for bankruptcy, and the fund’s Gamma stock is deemed 
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The mechanics of allocation, distribution, and clawback are as important as they 
are difficult to draft.  These provisions determine how funds divide up profits; as such, 
they influence the behavior of the managers.  
2.  The carry in venture capital funds:  the missing preferred return
Venture capital funds, in contrast to other buyout funds, do not give LPs a 
preferred return or hurdle rate.  All profits are divided 80-20 between the LPs and the GP.  
While obviously simpler than using a preferred return mechanism, this allocation seems 
to fail the basic goal of contingent compensation arrangements:  rewarding superior 
performance.  By failing to use a preferred return, venture funds reward both superior and 
mediocre performance. 
A simple example illustrates the problem.  Suppose the LPs invest $100 million in 
a typical fund with a ten-year life.  The fund shows returns of 4% per year, and at the end 
of ten years the portfolio companies are sold for a total of $148 million.  Despite this sub-
par performance, the GP will receive nearly $10 million of carry.  And yet the LPs could 
have achieved a better return on their investment by investing in safer securities, such as 
corporate bonds or even ultra-safe Treasury bonds.  Given the sophistication of the 
institutional investors who make these investments, the compensation design is puzzling.
The absence of a preferred return in venture funds is common but not universal.  
In a recent detailed empirical study of venture capital partnership agreements, none of the 
38 agreements studied contained a preferred return.33  Most practitioners I spoke with 
reported not using a preferred return.  On the other hand, one recent industry study 
reported that “[p]referred returns have become dramatically more popular among venture 
funds in the past two years.”34  That study reported that 35% of venture capital fund 
agreements included a preferred return.35  It is useful to know that some venture funds do 
include a preferred return; one possibility, discussed below, is that the VC’s reputation 
helps account for the disparity in contract design.36 Similarly, the presence of the 
preferred return in buyout funds is common but not universal.  In one recent survey, 90% 
of buyout funds used a preferred return.37
B.  How It Matters
worthless.  The fund prepares for liquidation.  Under the terms of the partnership agreement, the GP must 
return the $7 of carry to the partnership, since the LPs have not received back their initial $100 investment 
in the fund.  
33
 See Litvak, supra note [xx].  In an email exchange, Professor Litvak confirmed that none of the 
agreements contained preferred return provisions.
34 See David Toll, PRIVATE EQUITY PARTNERSHIP TERMS AND CONDITIONS (2d ed. 2001), at 53.
35 See id.
36 See infra text accompanying notes [xx]; Daniel Covitz & Nellie Liang, Recent Developments in the 
Private Equity Market and the Role of Preferred Returns (available on ssrn.com) (Jan. 2002 draft) at 17.
37 See Toll, supra note [xx], at 52.
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Venture investing is risky business.  At first glance, considering the presence or 
absence of a preferred return seems like a trivial pursuit.  After all, if a venture fund 
invests in a series of Internet flame-outs, the GP would not receive any carry at all.  If it 
funds the next Google, returning the LPs’ initial investment ten-fold, then the GP would 
clear any hurdle, making the preferred return irrelevant.38
In fact, the absence of a preferred return can and does make a difference in the 
real world.  The compounding effect of the preferred return calculation makes it 
significant over the course of a ten or twelve year fund.  Moreover, the risky nature of 
venture investing is sometimes overstated.  It is certainly true that many of the underlying 
investments in start-ups will turn out to be worthless.  The gamble at the portfolio 
company level is moderated, however, by the aggregation of risk at the fund level.   A 
venture fund might make investments in ten or fifteen portfolio companies.  While each 
individual portfolio company is very risky, funds are somewhat less so.  
And so it is worth a closer look at when the preferred return really matters.  The 
preferred return matters when one of two situations arises:  funds that make some profits 
but never clear the hurdle rate, and profitable funds that clear the hurdle but then fall 
back.  
1.  Nominally profitable funds
The first and more obvious way that the preferred return makes a difference is 
when a fund is profitable but never clears the hurdle rate.  Suppose LPs invest $100 in a 
fund and ten years later receive back $150.  In the absence of a preferred return, even 
though the investment has a negative net present value (in hindsight), the GP is able to 
take $10 of the $50 “profit” as the carried interest.  If the partnership agreement included 
a preferred return, the GP receives no carry. 
38 See Gary Rivlin, Google is One for the Books, Leaving Some With Regrets, New York Times, Aug. 23, 
2004, at C1 (discussing how Google’s VCs turned $11 million into $3 billion in five years). 




















The preceding diagram shows the payout scheme for (1) “straight carry”: a fund with no 
preferred return (most VC funds), (2) “hurdle rate”: a fund with a preferred return and a 
100% catch-up provision (most buyout funds) and (3) a true preferred return.  The red 
line represents the payout for most VC funds and shows positive returns starting at 100 
and increasing with a slope of 0.2.  The green line shows the payout for a true preferred 
return, starting at 216 and increasing with a slope of 0.2.  The blue line, which represents 
the payout for most buyout funds, starts at 216 (the hurdle number) but starts with a slope 
of 1.  This is the catch-up period, where every additional dollar earned by the fund is 
allocated to the GP.  Once the catch-up point is reached, additional allocations are 80-20, 
bringing the payouts back in line with funds with no preferred return.  
The triangle shaded in yellow represents the possible difference in value between 
a fund with and without a hurdle rate.  If the fund value falls between 100 and 270, the 
value of the preferred return to the LP can be determined by the height of the triangle at 
that point.  The expected value of the preferred return is more difficult to calculate, of 
course, because it depends on the probability that the fund value will end up in that range
and the effect that the preferred return has on that probability.        
2.  Clawbacks in profitable funds 
The second, more subtle way that the preferred return makes a difference is in the 
calculation of clawbacks.  Suppose a fund has some early successes but later failures.  At 
a minimum, the GP, which received carry on the early successes, has to give back any 
carry in excess of 20% of cumulative profits.  
Some partnership agreements go further, however, requiring the GP to give back 
any carry in excess of the initial capital investment plus a preferred return.39  Suppose a 
fund with an initial value of $100 has some early success, reaping $110 from the sale of 
portfolio companies and a total profit of $30.  The GP receives $6 of carry.  The 
remaining portfolio companies fail, and the fun liquidates after three years.  The preferred 
return now amounts to $126.40  At the time of liquidation, the GP would have to give back 
not just the $4 in excess profits, but the full $6, because the fund has returned just $110; it 
has not, in the aggregate, cleared the $126 hurdle.  Such a clawback provision, which I 
call a “creeping clawback,” reflects the economics of a true preferred return by 
guaranteeing a minimum return to the LPs in any profitable situation.  Without a creeping 
clawback, a preferred return accomplishes this goal if the fund has failures before 
successes but not vice versa.41
39 See Schell, supra note [xx], at 2-24.
40
 The calculation is as follows:  $100(1.08)3= $126.
41 A creeping clawback reduces an important timing benefit GPs enjoy when they achieve early successes in 
a fund but later failures.  Under a traditional clawback, the GP must return excess carry to the fund – but 
without interest.  Kate Litvak has noted how this is equivalent to an interest free loan from the LPs to the 
GPs.  See Litvak, supra note [xx].  In the example above, under a traditional clawback, the GP keeps $2 and 
returns $4 to the LPs for a net of 20% ($2 out of $10 total profits).  In addition, however, the GP has 
enjoyed the use of the $4 in the interim, interest-free.  Litvak’s research suggests that this timing benefit is 
quite valuable.  Under a creeping clawback, the GP returns the full $6 of nominal carry to the LPs.  While 
the GP still enjoys the use of the $6, the overall return to the GP is obviously much lower than a traditional 
clawback.  Under a traditional clawback, the GP keeps $2 plus the interest on $6; under the creeping 
clawback, the GP keeps just the interest on $6.  One might be troubled by the GP receiving anything in this 
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C.  How Often It Matters:  Empirical Evidence 
What impact would including a preferred return have on real world venture 
capital funds?  Empirical data suggests the term is more important than conventional 
wisdom suggests.  For the University of California Retirement System, a prominent 
institutional investor, nine out of forty-six venture funds from vintage years 1979 through 
1998 showed returns below 10%.  Of these, four were between 8 and 10%, which would 
place the fund in the “catch-up” zone.  Three others were positive but below 8%.42  Thus, 
for the University of California, in seven out of forty-six funds the presence of the 
preferred return term would have affected the payment of the carried interest to the GP.  
This apparent pay-for-underperformance is likely to get worse in the next few 
years.  Many venture funds in vintage year 1999, 2000 and 2001 invested heavily in 
Internet companies.43  GPs took carry on early successes as Internet companies went 
public.  Remaining portfolio companies have a slim chance of matching those earlier 
successes; many expect the returns for funds from vintage years 1999-2003 to have sub-
par returns.44
A possible explanation for the lack of academic attention paid to the missing 
preferred return is the difficulty of obtaining data.  Venture capital funds are exempt from 
the reporting requirements of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 and the Investment 
Company Act of 1940.45  Investors instead bargain for a contractual rights to observe how 
their capital is being deployed and calculate returns based on actual cash received back 
from the partnership.  Because this information is confidential, it is difficult to find 
reliable data showing returns for large numbers of funds over time to get a full sense of 
the importance of the preferred return.46  Practitioners report that arguments about the 
preferred return often devolve into simplistic arguments about what the “industry 
standard” is.47
situation; one could imagine forcing the GP to pay back interest as well, even if that meant forcing the GP 
to dip into its own pocketbook beyond previously received carry.  Traditionally, funds have avoided asking 
GPs to ever pay money into the fund beyond a 1% capital commitment at the time of initial investment. 
42
 See UCRS data, supra note [xx].  The relevant returns were:  5.5%, 7.0%, 8.4%, 9.2%, 8.4%, 4.5%, 9.3%, 
-10.7%, -4.3%.  Variation in the calculation of the preferred return makes it difficult to know for sure how 
many funds would be affected.  Still, this frequency is enough to show that the contract term is not trivial.  
43 See Bankman & Cole, supra note [xx].
44
 To make matters worse, as noted above, VCs who have taken carry on early successes have a strong 
incentive to delay liquidation of the fund, as the benefit of holding on to carry without incurring interest has 
significant financial impact.  See Litvak, supra note [x]. at pin.  A creeping clawback would counteract this 
incentive to delay by increasing the amount the GP has to pay back to the fund by 8% per year.  See supra 
text accompanying notes [xx].
45 See Schell, supra note [xx], at § 8.01[1].
46
 More data has become available recently as journalists and investor watchdogs have used state public 
records statutes to request information about the investment returns of state pension funds.  GPs are not 
pleased about this trend, nor are LPs who are being asked to leave some of the most prestigious funds.  See
Ann Grimes, Their Secretive Ways at Stake, Venture Firms Cut Off Investors, Wall St. J., Tuesday May 11, 
2004, at A1.
47
 See Joseph W. Bartlett & W. Eric Swan, Private Equity Funds: What Counts and What Doesn’t?, 26 J. 
CORP. L. 393, 394 (2001). 
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The fact that the preferred return only comes into play in a subset of cases does 
little to explain the puzzle.  Given that buyout funds and other private equity funds 
routinely include hurdle rates, all else equal one would expect venture funds to follow 
suit.  More importantly, perhaps, clearing the hurdle rate does not mean that the contract 
term was irrelevant.  The significance of the preferred return term is more than 
distributional; it changes incentives.  In the absence of a preferred return term, a GP may 
do a mediocre job, performing below the industry average, and still receive a nominally 
performance-based reward.  Incentives are misaligned.  The problem is fairly obvious, 
easy to fix, occurs in the real world, and yet remains unaddressed by the lawyers, venture 
capitalists, and institutional investors who negotiate these contracts.  The puzzle remains, 
then: why do venture funds fail to include a preferred return?  
III.  Conventional Wisdom
The conventional wisdom about the missing preferred return is grounded in the 
“home run” mentality of venture investing.48  Most private equity funds – real estate 
funds, buyout funds, mezzanine funds, etc. – invest in established companies with 
positive cash flows.  Venture funds, on the other hand, invest in start-ups with no 
immediate possibility of positive cash flow and only an uncertain hope of making money 
in the future.  Venture funds like to bet on “disruptive technologies” – companies with 
products that can change entire product markets.49  Most of these risky bets fail.  The 
high-risk, high-reward strategy makes it silly, say some fund managers, to quibble about 
preferred returns.  Either the gamble pays off and everyone goes home happy, or they 
shake it off and look to the next fund.  
The problem with this home-run-mentality explanation is that investors seem 
unlikely to fall for it.  The underlying assumption – that venture funds are either 
enormously successful or complete failures – simply isn’t true.  It is true that portfolio 
companies are mostly successful or not; only a few become “zombies” with middling 
returns.50  But funds, because they aggregate investments in as many as fifteen or twenty 
portfolio companies, have less variable returns.  And when funds do moderately well, 
hurdle rates come into play.  Moreover, if the presence or absence of a preferred return 
were insignificant, then one might just as well expect to find the term included rather than 
excluded, given its nearly universal presence in other types of private equity funds.  
A.  Bargaining Power
Many venture capitalists offered bargaining power as an explanation for the 
absence of a preferred return.  The demand for venture capital funds soared in the late 
1990s, putting VCs in a favorable bargaining position.  But bargaining power, by itself,
48
 See Fleischer, Rational Exuberance, supra note [x], at pin; Bankman, Structure of Silicon Valley Start-
Ups, supra note [x], at pin.
49
 Interview with Geoffrey Smith.
50
 Even this truism – that portfolio companies are either home runs or strikeouts – is an exaggeration.  
Compare Marcus Cole, Preference for Preferences (draft on file with author) (arguing that middle ground 
is more important) with Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, A Tax Explanation for Convertible 
Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874 (2003) (arguing that middle ground is relatively small and cannot 
explain use of preferred stock).  
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cannot explain the puzzle.  Bargaining power is better at explaining the amount of 
compensation one receives rather than the form of the compensation.51  Nor does 
bargaining power explain why VCs would choose to exercise their power here, on such 
an arcane contract term, rather than elsewhere in the contract.  After all, the preferred 
return term only matters in certain circumstances.  An optimistic VC might bargain for a 
higher percentage of the profits; a pessimist might bargain for a higher management fee.  
Only a deeply ambivalent VC would bargain for the absence of a preferred return term.  
Moreover, bargaining power has limited explanatory power because VCs have not 
always been in the dominant position at the negotiation table.  As recently as the mid-
1990s, many venture funds offered attractive deal terms to lure investors.  At the peak of 
this pro-LP period, a group of prominent institutional investors retained a consulting firm, 
Mercer Investment Consulting, to recommend changes to the design of fund agreements 
that LPs should press for.52  The Mercer Report proved to be controversial within the 
venture industry.  The report recommended some aggressive, pro-LP changes like no-
fault divorce clauses, advisory committees, and suspension-of-capital-call provisions.53
Some changes have been widely adopted; others have not.54  What is remarkable is that in 
the midst of this wish list, the Mercer Report offered only lukewarm support for a 
preferred return in the venture context.55  If bargaining power were the true explanation, 
one would have expected the Mercer Report to unambiguously suggest that LPs press for 
the term.  
B.  Historical Explanations and Contract Stickiness
History provides a clue, namely that the institutional differences between venture 
funds and buyout funds may help solve the puzzle.  When venture funds were first 
formed in the 1950s and 1960s, returns were calculated on an investment-by-investment 
basis (i.e., portfolio company-by-portfolio company).  Given the volatility of portfolio 
company returns, returns rarely fell in the middle range where the preferred return would 
come into play.  The costs of negotiating the term, drafting it, and explaining its 
relevance to clients may have even exceeded any increase in efficiency.56
Practitioners devised the preferred return when real estate funds and leverage 
buyout funds grew in popularity in the 1970s.  The expected returns from real estate and 
buyout investments were smaller and less volatile than venture investments.  Also, these 
funds began to calculate the carried interest on the aggregate level, further reducing the 
volatility of returns.  With middling returns more common, investors settled on a hurdle 
rate as a way of calculating a true performance-based return.  Little has changed since the 
51 See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab & Randall Thomas, What Do CEOs Bargain For? An Empirical Study of 
Key Legal Components of CEO Employment Contracts, (working paper available on ssrn.com).  
52 See William M. Mercer, Inc., Key Terms and Conditions for Private Equity Investing, 1996 (copy on file 
with author).  
53 See id. at 1-4.  
54 See Toll, supra note [xx], for a discussion of current practices.
55 See Mercer Report, supra note [xx], at 25.  The Mercer Report’s reasoning is discussed below.  See infra 
at text accompanying notes [xx].
56
 There are both distributional and efficiency implications for the preferred return; it only makes sense to 
add a new term to a contract if the efficiency gains outweigh the drafting costs.  If the drafting costs exceed 
efficiency gains (i.e. creating a net efficiency loss), then both parties are better off leaving the term out.  
18
1970s:  buyout, real estate, and other funds generally have a preferred return, while 
venture generally does not.  
Nowadays venture funds also calculate profits on an aggregate basis, not deal-by-
deal.  History helps explain the initial divergence but does little to justify the status quo.  
The stickiness of contract terms is another possible barrier between the status quo and a 
more efficient contract.57  Absent a pressing need to change, lawyers tend to copy 
language from prior agreements and may not fully consider other options.58  In this case, 
however, contract stickiness is an unlikely explanation.  The cost of switching to a 
preferred return is very low.  The increase in drafting costs is minimal:  the same law 
firms, and often the very same lawyers, draft fund agreements for both buyout funds and 
venture funds, and thus could easily drop in language that works.  Moreover, these same 
lawyers are already familiar with the mechanics of preferred returns, making the cost of 
educating clients relatively low.  Furthermore, the language at issue is not boilerplate.  
Terms are scrutinized and negotiated, especially in recent years.59
Thus, while history can help explain how the disparity between venture and 
buyout developed, it does little to explain its persistence.  With large amounts of money 
at stake and switching costs relatively low, one would expect the lawyers and investors 
who negotiate these contracts to gravitate towards more efficient contract terms. 
C.  Lack of Cash Flow
The Mercer Report suggested that a preferred return would be inappropriate for 
venture funds because the underlying portfolio companies in venture funds – start-ups –
do not have any cash flow available to pay the preferred return.60  Buyout funds, on the 
other hand, invest in established companies that generate cash.  The intuition seems to be 
that a preferred return only makes sense when a steady stream of cash flow exists. 
The intuition is understandable.  Paying a preferred return on a risky investment is 
counterintuitive to corporate finance gurus.  In most contexts, when an investor is entitled 
to a preferred return, the return is actually paid, and not just accrued, on a quarterly or 
semi-annual basis from cash flow generated by the business.  A holder of preferred stock 
in a corporation expects to receive regular dividends.61  Investors, therefore, generally 
associate preferential payouts with the availability of cash flow.  
57 See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of 
Sovereign Bonds (working paper available on SSRN); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover 
Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 931 
(1993); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or 
“The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1997).
58 See Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts are Written in “Legalese”, 77 CHI-KENT L. REV. [pin] (2001)
59 See Jerry Borrell, Work in Progress Column, VENTURE CAP. J., Jan. 1, 2004, at 1.
60 See Mercer Report, supra note [xx], at 25.  Given the disparity between venture funds and the rest of 
private equity, one would have expected the Mercer Report to recommend including a preferred return.  In 
fact, the Mercer Report says little about the absence of the preferred return in venture funds; it notes only 
that “[i]t is found less frequently in early stage venture capital funds because these investments generally 
do not produce cash early in the life of the partnership.”  Id.  
61
 An even better example is debt:  it would make no sense to finance a venture fund entirely with debt, as 
the lack of steady cash flow would place the fund in default, triggering a costly bankruptcy.
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Like bargaining power and history, however, cash flow fails to hold up as a robust 
explanation.  Because LPs lack the power to place the fund in default if the preferred 
return is not paid, interim cash flow is not relevant; only the ultimate performance of the 
fund matters.  The goal of the preference is to benchmark the performance of the manager 
by affecting the capital account, not to establish priority of distribution of available 
interim cash flow.  Preferences perform this role in other areas of corporate finance and 
even in the venture context.  For example, in the case of convertible preferred stock 
investments in start-ups, the dividend preference may accrue, giving the fund a larger 
stake in the company over time, and also giving the preferred stockholders priority in the
event of liquidation.62
D.  Horizontal Equity with Public Company Executives
Efficiency may not be the only driver of compensation practices.  Horizontal 
equity – in the sense of making as much money as one’s peers – might also help explain 
the makeup of a compensation package.63  The leading treatise on private equity funds, 
James Schell’s Private Equity Funds: Business Structure and Operations, justifies the 
missing preferred return by pointing to public company executives.64 Public company 
executives, Schell explains, do not have similar requirements.65  Schell recognizes that the 
preferred return can affect the performance of management, noting that “a Preferred 
Return serves the alignment of interest concept by linking the Carried Interest to superior 
performance.”66  Schell acknowledges that the carried interest may not always reflect 
superior performance, but he remains unconvinced of its virtue.  “From a purely 
analytical point of view,” he notes, “it is not obvious that no Carried Interest should be 
payable unless investment returns exceed a specified level.”67
Schell defends the status quo by drawing an analogy to the compensation of 
public company executives.  Compensation structures, he explains, do not always impose 
a requirement that executives exceed a benchmark.68 “For example,” he continues, 
“corporations frequently grant stock options to executives and establish the exercise price 
based on the underlying stock price on the date the option is granted.”69  Despite the fact 
that the exercise price is fixed and does not increase over time, “the interests of the 
executive are considered aligned with those of the shareholders in the sense that the stock 
must appreciate in order for the option to have value.”70  Schell recognizes that this 
approach – by far the most common approach for compensating public company 
executives – may reward mediocre performance.  He explains, “the corporate executive 
62 See Cole, Preference for Preferences, supra note [xx]; Gilson & Schizer, supra note [xx].  
63 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note [xx]; Jensen & Murphy on compensation committees.  Cite to research 
showing that compensation committees often look to what peer CEOs make.
64 See Schell, supra note [xx], at § 2.03[1].
65 See id.
66 See id. Schell explains that “[i]nvestors sometimes express this point in negotiations by asking why they 
should give up 20% of the profits attributable to their capital if a higher return could have been obtained in 
a money market fund or other low risk investment.” Id.
67 Id.
68 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, supra note [xx].  
69 See Schell, supra note [xx], at § 2.03[1].
70 Id.
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participates in the appreciation of the stock on a first dollar basis and his or her incentive 
compensation is not conditioned upon superior performance.”71
To the extent that the purpose of fund agreements is merely to create horizontal 
equity with public company executives, Schell’s explanation has some merit.  But 
Schell’s analogy does little to explain the difference between venture funds and buyout 
funds.  Both types of funds potentially compete with public companies for talent, and yet 
only venture funds exclude a preferred return.  
More importantly, Schell’s analogy provides no reason for using public company 
compensation as a model for private equity compensation practices.  To the extent that 
we expect the LP Agreement to align the incentives of investor and manager – a goal we 
should also maintain for public company executives – Schell’s analogy only removes the 
puzzle one level higher:  is the compensation of public company executives a good 
model? 
Executive stock option practices are deeply flawed.72  Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse 
Fried and David Walker argue, for example, that at-the-money options serve as a rent -
extraction device, allowing executives to maximize pay while minimizing outrage costs.73
Central to their argument is the fixed, at-the-money strike price of the typical option 
package.  By failing to index the strike price of the option to industry benchmarks or to 
account for the time value of the option, options allow executives to camouflage their 
compensation and avoid incurring outrage costs by offended shareholders.74 In a recent 
article, Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy conclude that corporate boards should 
consider cost-of-capital indexed options to make executives more sensitive to 
performance.  Because many of the norms and institutional factors that lead to non-
indexed options in the public company context are not present in the private equity 
context, this literature has limited direct application to the puzzle of the missing preferred 
return.75  What is clear from this literature, however, is that few commentators would 
adopt executive stock options to be a suitable model for private equity practices.
E.  Distorting Incentives
An industry report by a trade group, Asset Alternatives, provides a promising 
explanation:  perhaps venture funds do not include a preferred return because a preferred 
return might distort, rather than align, the incentives of the GP.76  Implicitly, the report 
71
 Schell, supra note [x], at § 2.03[1].  Schell goes on to note that the analogy to public company executives 
may be more compelling “in case of smaller Funds where the fixed compensation of the Principals derived 
from Management Fees may be less than that of executives with comparable levels of experience in more 
conventional financial institutions.”  I am not sure I understand why this should be the case; just because 
gross compensation is larger does not make a windfall more efficient.
72 See Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1901, 1906-08 
(2001) (identifying problems with traditional option plans); David M. Schizer, Indexed Options; David M. 
Schizer, Executives and Hedging.
73 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the 
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. [pin] (2002).
74 See id..
75 See Levmore, supra note [xx].  
76 See Toll, supra note [xx], at 53.
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recognizes that the presence or absence of a preferred return term can affect VCs’ attitude 
toward risk.  But thinking about the issue is rather muddled.  In discussing preferred 
returns, the report notes that for reasons that are “quite specific to the dynamics of 
venture capital investing,” limited partners “generally have refrained” from seeking 
preferred returns on venture funds.77  The report explains that “the primary reason for LP 
restraint here is the fear of unintentionally distorting the incentives that motivate” the 
VCs.78
The report cites two examples of how a preferred return might distort incentives.  
First, the report explains, a preferred return term might make VCs too cautious.  “The 
concern is that in order to ensure that they achieve the preferred return goal, a venture 
capital group might make conservative investments that have limited upside but also 
quite limited downside.”79  Second, the report explains that if the VCs strike out on its 
first handful of deals, the added hurdle of a preferred return might lead them to give up 
hope prematurely.80
The first example – making GPs overly cautious – is unpersuasive.  The preferred 
return term has the effect of making the GP less cautious, not more.  If the benchmark is 
raised, the manager must perform better and take more risk to achieve the higher goal.  
Moreover, it is not clear that it is possible for VCs to be both cautious and yet still 
confident that they could exceed an 8% return.  After all, if safe investments yielding 
greater than 8% were readily available, one would not need an intermediary to invest.  
Rather, just the opposite is true:  a preferred return eliminates the possibility of GPs 
sitting back and making safe investments rather than aggressively sourcing investments. 81
The second example – the early strike out example – is more plausible.  After a 
few failures, a GP might become increasingly desperate and make risky, negative net 
present value investments in the slim hope of landing a big fish.  A GP might even 
abandon a fund with early strikeouts or pay little attention beyond the minimum needed 
to justify acceptance of the management fee. 
If the early strike out problem were the driving force behind the absence of a 
preferred return, however, one might expect a different solution.  The partnership 
agreement could calculate carry on a deal-by-deal basis, as was done in the early days of 
venture funds.   Alternatively, LPs could volunteer to “re-price” the preferred return, just 
as public company compensation committees often re-price stock options when the 
options are deep out of the money.82 Furthermore, if the early strike out problem were 





 See infra [section on moral hazard in LBO funds.]
82 A consistent practice of re-pricing the preferred return might distort ex ante incentives; but then again so 
does failing to include a preferred return.  Eliminating the preferred return distorts incentives in all cases, 
ex ante, but improves incentives only in a few (those funds that have some early strikeouts).  Nor does 
excluding a preferred return really solve the early strike out problem.  All it does is keep an out of the 
money carry from becoming deeper out of the money over time.  Anytime the carry is out of the money, the 
VC will have an incentive to take more risk than is optimal from the investors’ point of view.  A better 
solution would be to give the VC a capital interest rather than a profits interest in the fund.  
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truly the paramount concern, one might expect GPs to receive a percentage of the fund, 
not just a percentage of the profits.  Giving GPs something to lose on the downside as 
well as something to gain on the upside would eliminate this distortion of incentives.  
The effect of the preferred return on the incentives of the GP is the most 
promising line of inquiry.  Bargaining power, history, cash flow, and horizontal equity 
offer some superficial appeal, but none holds up well under closer scrutiny.  Incentives 
might.  The existing literature does little to clarify exactly what incentives the absence of 
a preferred return creates.  Is it intended to make GPs risk averse or to help them 
overcome risk aversion?  If it is intended to change risk preferences over time, then why 
is it structured with a fixed hurdle rate?   I turn to these questions now in Section IV.
IV.  The Efficiency (and Inefficiency) of the Preferred Return
The partnership agreement guides the behavior of the managers and investors.  
Compensation terms are no exception; contractual provisions regarding VC pay are 
designed to attract, incentivize, and reward good performance, and to deter and penalize 
shirking.  To understand whether a preferred return would improve incentives, I consider 
the context of how VCs create value over the life of a fund.  
A.  Aligning Incentives
Private equity faces a familiar problem:  the separation of ownership and control.  
LPs contribute capital to the fund but do not directly control the use of the capital, instead 
relying on the GP to invest on their behalf.  Several factors create an incentive for the GP 
to work hard, find good portfolio companies to invest in, and spend time working with 
management of these companies to increase their value.  These factors include fiduciary 
duties, management fees, reputation, and the carried interest.
Fiduciary duties do not provide a strong incentive to work hard.  In theory, the 
general partner of a partnership has extremely strong fiduciary duties to its partners.  In 
Meinhard v. Salmon, Justice Cardozo explained that partners owe one another "the duty 
of the finest loyalty. . . . Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."83  While academics are fond of trotting out 
Cardozo’s famous dictum, this exaggerates the state of the law.84 The business decisions 
of GPs are effectively insulated from court review.85  The common law provides 
incentives not to lie, cheat, or steal, but not much of an incentive to work especially hard 
or to be especially talented in the first place.  
83
 See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, pin (N.Y. 1928).  
84 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS & LLCS 139 (Foundation Press 2004) (noting that 
even in the duty of loyalty context, it is not necessarily a violation to further one’s own interest). See also 
Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, (draft available on SSRN).
85 See id. at 176 (noting possible application of business judgment rule in partnership context). In a recent 
high-profile case, a private equity fund was found to have breached its fiduciary duties by making  
investments in excess of a contractual cap; the jury, however, refused to award damages, finding that the 
investors had ratified or acquiesced to the investments.  See Weil Goltshal, Verdict Reached in Connecticut 
v. Forstmann Little, available at http://www.altassets.com/pdfs/weiljuly.pdf.
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The management fee also fails to provide a strong incentive to work hard.  GPs 
typically receive an annual management fee of between one and three percent of the 
capital committed to the fund.86  The management fee pays for the administrative 
expenses of the fund, legal expenses, and pays the handsome salaries of the professionals 
who work for the GP.  The management fee is not contingent on the profitability of the 
fund.  Because the management fee is paid regardless of the performance of the fund, it 
creates only a weak financial incentive.  The only recourse for unhappy LPs is to seek the 
removal of the GP, a drastic step that is difficult to accomplish under most contracts.  If 
anything, then, the quasi-guaranteed management fee creates an incentive to be 
somewhat tentative and risk averse; a mediocre GP who follows the herd is unlikely to be 
ousted absent self-dealing or some other breach that is easier to prove.  
Reputation provides a significant performance incentive for some funds.  By the 
third or fourth year in the life of a typical fund, the GP has already begun raising money 
for its next fund.  LPs considering investing in the next fund will conduct considerable 
diligence on the prior performance of the GP.  Nonetheless, reputation is only a partial 
solution to the agency costs problem.  Within the group of professionals that makes up a 
GP, some individuals may be more talented than others, but performance metrics rarely 
track the involvement of each individual manager.  As an individual works hard and 
creates value for the fund, his colleagues may share the benefit.  An individual who 
locates a portfolio company that proves successful, however, may see a direct increase in 
her own compensation, depending on the fund’s internal profit sharing rules.87
The carried interest thus provides the most powerful incentive to work hard.  A 
large carry is one of the hallmarks of a private equity fund, and it is considered essential 
to attracting talented managers.  While private equity managers could live well on their 
base salaries alone, they would not be truly rich.  Only the massive compensation of the 
carried interest of a successful fund can do that, and it is the prodigious carry of 
successful private equity funds that lures professionals away from investment banks, 
commercial banks and other investment management companies.88
B.  The Option Analogy
Characterizing the carried interest as an option can help us understand under what 
conditions the current design of the carried interest in venture funds properly aligns 
incentives.89 A carried interest is a derivative and can be analyzed as such to understand 
the preferences, and thus the incentives, of the derivative holder.  A derivative is a 
financial contract that has a value derived from some underlying security, commodity or 
86
 This amount sometimes decreases in the later years of the fund, when most of the fund’s capital as been 
committed and the expenses of the fund decrease.
87
 Internal GP compensation practices are an even bigger mystery than GP-LP practices.  Many GPs appear 
to adjust carried interest shares according to the involvement of each individual in a particular deal.  See 
Schell, supra note [xx], at § 4.04[4].
88
 Some VCs who have already achieved financial independence may be motivated more by the psychic 
satisfaction of creating new technologies and finding the next Google or funding a biotech company that 
cures cancer.  At the margins, though, most VCs remain sensitive to financial considerations.  Few, after 
all, would do this work for free.
89 See  Sahlman, supra note [xx].
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fact.  A stock option, for example, is a derivative that has a value determined by reference 
to the value of an underlying stock.  An interest rate swap is a derivative that rises and 
falls in value as interest rates go up or down.  Here, the partnership agreement is a 
financial contract, and the value of the carried interest provision of the contract depends 
on the value of the underlying fund.  Thus, it may be useful to think of the carry as a 
derivative and compare its performance characteristics to other derivatives to understand 
better how the financial payouts of the carry affect the holder’s incentives and attitudes 
towards risk over time.  In this case, the carried interest most closely resembles a call 
option, a common derivative used in the capital markets.90  A call option gives the holder 
the right, but not the obligation, to buy a fixed amount of the underlying for a fixed price 
and some point in the future. 
To be more precise, a 20% carry is financially equivalent to a call option on 20% 
of the value of the fund.91  The holder of the carried interest, like the holder of a call 
option, enjoys the possibility of theoretically unlimited upside gain but bears no risk of 
loss.  If the fund increases in value, the GP shares in the profits, just as would happen 
when an option holder exercises an option.  If the fund loses value, the GP has neither 
gain nor loss, again, just like an option holder who declines to exercise an option.
A numerical example may help illustrate the analogy.  A 20% carried interest is 
financially equivalent to a call option on 20% of the value of the fund, with a fixed 
exercise price equal to 20% of the initial investment in the fund.  Consider a fund with an 
initial capital amount of $100.  If the fund appreciates to $400, the GP has the right to call 
20% of the fund (20% of $400, or $80) at a strike price of 20% of the initial capital 
amount (20% of $100, or $20).  The difference between the current market value of the 
option ($80) and the strike price ($20) represents the GP’s profit ($60).  This $60 profit 
on the option is equivalent to a carried interest of 20%, as a carry of 20% of the overall 
profits of the fund, or $300, is also $60.  The analogy holds on the downside:  if the value 
of the fund declines below its initial value, the carried interest has no current liquidation 
value, just like the holder of an out of the money call option.
The option analogy is useful because it 
allows us to tap into the extensive research 
90 See id.
91
 The carried interest is analogous to an American-style call option on common stock.  American-style 
means that the option holder may exercise the option at any time before the expiration expires, while 
European-style options must be exercised only on the fixed expiration date.  The carried interest resembles 
an American-style option because the GP largely controls when the fund realizes its investments by selling 




















on executive compensation in the context of public company executives.  Executives of 
public companies typically receive a pay package that includes a cash salary and stock 
options; the options typically have a strike price at the money and a ten-year term.  Few 
academics believe that this package is ideal:  reform proposals include the use of indexed 
options and replacing options with restricted stock.
To index an option means resetting the strike price according to a formula.  For 
example, one might set the strike price of an option to move along with a basket of stock 
prices.  An executive at Delta Airlines, for example, might receive options with a strike 
price based on and index of the stock prices of American, United, and Continental.  If the 
whole airline industry falls upon hard times, pushing all airline stocks down, but Delta 
weathers the storm better than its competitors, then the strike price of the option drops 
along with the basket, allowing the Delta executive to be rewarded for her superior 
performance relative to her peers at other airlines.  If airline stocks soar but Delta falls 
behind, the executive will not be rewarded.92
A second type of indexed options, cost-of-capital-indexed-options, moves the 
strike price higher over time to reflect the company’s cost-of-capital.93  Thus, if the 
company’s cost of capital (the amount of interest or expected return it must pay to raise 
additional money in the capital markets) is 10%, the strike price of the executive’s option 
will increase by 10% per year.  If the company’s stock price rises slowly, but does not 
match the investors’ expected return, then the executive will not be rewarded.  
Options, whether indexed or not, have a significant drawback:  when they are out 
of the money, they can induce overly risky behavior on the part of the executives.  
Imagine an executive with options with a strike price of $100 and one year remaining 
until expiration.  Now suppose that the stock is currently trading at $50, and the executive 
is setting the corporate strategy for the upcoming year.  If the company does well but not 
spectacularly well, the executive will not be rewarded; only if the company doubles its 
stock price will the executive receive anything.  The executive may become overly risk-
seeking, then, taking unwise gambles, even if such gambles have a negative net present 
value to the shareholders.  
Some critics of stock options have suggested that executives should receive 
restricted stock rather than stock options.94  Restricted stock can improve incentives 
between the shareholders and the executive by giving the executive something to lose on 
the downside as well as something to gain on the upside, just like shareholders.95  A 
drawback of restricted stock, however, is that it may not work well for risk averse
executives, who may become too focused on preserving value rather than creating 
additional value in the firm.  
92
 For a discussion of indexed options, see Levmore, supra note [xx]; Bebchuk & Fried, supra note [xx].
93 See G. Bennett Stewart, Remaking the Corporation from Within, 68 HARVARD BUS. REV. 12-13 1990
94 See Jensen & Murphy and cites therein.
95
 Restricted stock may also appeal to executives who demand a high risk premium with options, thereby 
allowing companies to save on overall compensation.  See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options 
for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. Acct. & Econ. 3, 37 (2002).
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How does the carried interest compare to executive stock options?  The carried 
interest is equivalent to a call option with an at-the-money strike price.  A carried interest 
with a true preferred return is equivalent to a cost-of-capital indexed option.  Restricted 
stock is not equivalent to any type of carried interest at all, but rather to a capital interest 
in the partnership.  The analogy is easy; the hard part is figuring out exactly what this 
means for venture funds.  I turn now to this task.  
C.  The Efficiency and Inefficiency of the Preferred Return
There are tradeoffs, even in a world without taxes.  When pay is contingent on 
performance, VCs have a stronger incentive to succeed.  But because the success of a 
fund is not entirely within their control, VCs demand a risk premium when their pay is 
contingent.  Paying for mediocre performance is a bad deal, but risk premium makes 
paying for performance costly in a different way.  Pay should linked to performance if, 
but only if, linking them together increases the expected value of the fund above and 
beyond the amount of risk premium paid to the VC.96
To get better traction on this question of efficient compensation design, I focus on 
two areas where financial incentives may stimulate better performance:  deal flow and 
deal harvesting.  Deal flow relates to the VC’s ability to find good portfolio investments.  
Deal harvesting relates to the VC’s ability to bring those investments to a successful exit.  
Because not all venture firms are the same – VCs have different reputations, abilities, and 
risk tolerance – there may not be a single optimal compensation design.  But we can 
nevertheless draw some conclusions about the relative efficiency and inefficiency of 
different compensation schemes through closer examination of the context in which VCs 
perform their duties for investors.  
1.  Assumptions
It may be useful to spell out my assumptions about what makes a certain 
compensation design efficient.  I make four assumptions.   First, I assume that VCs are 
motivated in part by financial incentives.  Perhaps some VCs are rich enough that they 
would work for free.  But the ubiquity of the carried interest suggests that money 
influences VCs’ decisions about how much effort to expend choosing, advising and 
monitoring companies.
Second, I assume that some VCs have better reputations than others, and that 
investors can discover these reputations at low cost.  Reputation is important in many 
business contexts, but perhaps especially so in venture capital.  Sand Hill Road is a tight-
knit community, and word gets around quickly.97 VCs network with entrepreneurs, 
investors, and amongst themselves, in person, by email, and on blogs.  
96 See generally Jensen & Murphy, supra.
97
 Dozens of venture capital funds are located on the same road, Sand Hill Road, near Palo Alto.  This not 
only facilitates networking and allows them to keep a close eye on the portfolio companies they invest in; it 
also creates a community where word gets around and monitoring VC behavior is relatively easy for 
investors.  See ANNA LEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE; Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure 
of High-Tech Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants not to Compete, 74 NYU LAW 
REV. 575 (1999).
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Third, I assume that VCs value their reputations and can be expected to try to act 
in ways that will preserve their reputations.  Reputational constraints are powerful 
because investors are repeat players.  Institutional investors such as pension funds, 
university endowments and insurance companies return to the venture capital market 
again and again, and are in a position to punish VCs who misbehave by refusing to invest 
in their next fund.98
Lastly, I assume that VCs are risk averse. Venture capitalists hardly fit the 
stereotype of a Nervous Nelly.  VCs are stereotyped as free-wheeling innovators who like 
risk for its own sake.  They are the cowboys of the investment world.  But the cultural 
stereotype may be a bit of an exaggeration.  VCs take calculated risks, and they do so 
with other people’s money.  There is little reason to think that when it comes to their own 
personal finances, VCs behave all that differently than other executives.  Like everyone
else, VCs enjoy decreasing marginal utility from each additional dollar that they earn.  
For highly successful VCs, this may just mean that their first private jet is more dear than 
their second.  But most VCs have a salary structure similar to a typical investment 
banker.99 Venture capitalists have high recurring expenses for mortgage payments, car 
payments, private school tuition, and the like.  Given a choice between $10 million over 
the next ten years or a 50-50 shot at $21 million, most VCs would choose the sure thing. 
VCs cannot diversify away their firm-specific risk, and so they demand a risk premium 
when compensation is tied to firm performance.100
2.  Deal Flow Incentives
With these assumptions in mind, I turn now to the context of how VCs create 
value to consider whether the carried interest properly aligns incentives.  VCs are not 
passive money managers.  They create value for their investors by locating good portfolio 
companies, choosing well among possible investments, and negotiating favorable 
investment terms.  This activity in the early years of a fund’s existence can all be 
bracketed as relating to “deal flow.” Deal flow comes easy to elite VCs.  When 
entrepreneurs seek funding for a new idea, they turn first to the royalty of Silicon Valley:  
Kleiner Perkins, Sequoia, Benchmark, and other elite venture funds.  Entrepreneurs know 
98
 Cite to Gilson, Gompers.
99
 On the surprising stress of maintaining a wealthy lifestyle, see TOM WOLFE, BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES.
100 Research by financial economists supports the assumption that VCs are risk averse.  A model by 
Professors Charles Jones and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf finds that a straight carried interest best aligns the 
incentives of the risk averse VC with the principals.  See Charles M. Jones & Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, The 
Price of Diversifiable Risk in Venture Capital and Private Equity, available on SSRN, May 2003 version, 
at 5.  A capital interest would encourage VCs to diversify away some firm-specific risk by investing in too 
many portfolio companies.  A straight carried interest, by rewarding the VCs for volatility, moderates the 
risk aversion.  A preferred return, however, would go too far, encouraging too much risk-taking at the cost 
of returns.  Id. at 23. The Jones-Rhodes-Kropf model is useful, but fails to fully answer the question at 
hand, which is why LBO funds are subject to preferred returns, but VCs are not.  Some of their 
assumptions, moreover, are questionable as they pertain to the question at hand.  For example, they assume 
that VCs are not limited in the number of projects they can invest in.  Id. at 7, n.12.    By contract, however, 
most VCs cannot invest in more than [x] projects.  It is possible, then, that it may be more efficient to 
compensate VCs with a capital interest, and address the over-diversification problem with a contractual 
restriction.  Moreover, the model fails to reflect the impact of taxes, which may distort the incentive effects 
considerably, as I discuss below.
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these well-established funds can provide valuable capital, management expertise, 
customer contacts and executive staffing contacts to help the company grow.  With 
talented entrepreneurs knocking at the door, high-reputation VCs can be choosier about 
which deals they fund, and they might be able to negotiate better terms.  Lesser- known 
VC funds can also achieve good deal flow, but they must work a bit harder to get it.  VCs 
do this by attending technology conferences, networking with entrepreneurs and other 
VCs, studying developing technologies and industries, working with university 
researchers, and so on.101
Deal flow sometimes refers only to the rate at which firms receive potential offers 
of investment.  I use the term more broadly to encompass not just receiving a high 
number of potential deals, but also to refer to the quality of the deals and the VCs’ ability 
to turn those potential deals into actual closings with attractive deal terms.  Venture 
capitalists exercise discretion in choosing projects and negotiating the terms of 
investment.  The due diligence process has become more important in recent years.  
Before investing, VCs often interview everyone they reasonably can, including founders, 
managers, suppliers, and customers.  VCs must research the relevant markets and 
competition to assess the portfolio company’s likelihood of success.  
The ability to secure good deal flow is especially important in market 
environments where there is “money chasing deals.”  VCs today report a scarcity of ideas 
and entrepreneurs relative to the amount of money that continues to flow into the venture 
capital sector.  As one practitioner explained it, “God grades on a curve.”102 A thin 
market for entrepreneurs creates a moral hazard risk:  VCs will be tempted to invest all of 
the committed capital, even if not every investment is likely to be profitable.  In 
particular, VCs with weak networks may have trouble sourcing deals and may accept the 
first proposals to come along, regardless of their likelihood of success.  Even for VCs 
with strong deal flow, accepting proposals quickly might allow the VCs to turn their 
attention to other tasks, like raising money for their next fund.  
A preferred return can help align the deal flow incentives of the VC with the goals 
of their investors.  If compensation is contingent on exceeding a preferred return, VCs are 
more likely to invest only in companies that are likely to exceed this return.  To address 
the parallel concern in the public company context, Professors Jensen and Murphy argue 
that companies should consider giving executives cost-of-capital indexed options.103 A 
cost-of-capital indexed option addresses the opportunity cost when executives invest 
money in deals that offer subpar returns; it would be more efficient if they returned the 
money to the investors to allow them to invest elsewhere.  By raising the strike price over 
time, cost-of-capital indexed options make executives aware of the hurdle rate they must 
achieve to satisfy investors, and it gives them the financial incentive to do so.
Extending this model to the venture capital context is tricky.  Context matters; 
VCs may not face the same choices that public company executives face.  To understand 
101
 For an empirical study on the importance of VC Networking, see Yael Hochberg, Alexander Ljundqvist 
& Yang Lu, Who You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance (draft Dec. 
2004, available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=631941). 
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 David Chen, Willamette Conference.
103 See  Jensen & Murphy, supra note [xx].
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the impact of compensation design on deal flow incentives, I consider four possible 
compensation designs:  a true preferred return, a hurdle rate, a straight carried interest 
with no preferred return, and a capital interest in the partnership.  Other compensation 
designs are possible: one could imagine a tiered carried interest where the percentage of 
the carry increases as the amount of profits increase.  For example, VCs could receive 
10% of the first $10 million in profits, 20% of the next $10 million, and 30% of any 
additional profits.  Or one could imagine a carried interest that is indexed to the 
performance of peer funds.  For (relative) simplicity, however, it seems useful to consider 
the efficiency of the most common compensation schemes – a hurdle rate and a straight 
carried interest – and two closely related schemes that seem to improve efficiency over 
the status quo – a true preferred return, and a capital interest in the partnership.
If encouraging VCs to create good deal flow and to properly exercise discretion in 
funding projects is the paramount goal, then a true preferred return appears to be more 
efficient than the alternatives.104 A preferred return rewards VCs with a share of the 
profits only to the extent they choose projects that exceed the investors’ cost of capital.  
When VCs find companies that seem unlikely to meet the necessary return, they will 
have an incentive to engage in further networking to find better alternatives.  
Buyout funds’ use of an 8% preferred return thus seems to reflect investors’ 
concerns about how fund managers choose portfolio companies.  At the same time, if the 
goal is to create the financial equivalent of a cost-of-capital indexed option, then the 
industry standard hurdle rate of 8% used by many private equity funds seems rather 
arbitrary.  An investor’s cost of capital might be lower or higher than this amount, and 
would be expected to vary as interest rates rise and fall.  It may be that the common use 
of 8% as a hurdle rate reflects the peculiar nature of venture capital and private equity, 
where many investors are pension funds.  The 8% number may have originated by a 
demand by pension funds, which often use a discount rate of 8% to calculate their future 
liabilities.105  To the extent private equity investments can clear this discount rate, pension 
fund managers are achieving the return necessary to improve the financial security of 
their own principals.  
While a preferred return can improve deal flow incentives, this increase in 
efficiency comes at a cost.  Because the carried interest starts “later”, i.e., at a higher 
strike price, VCs will demand a higher percentage of carried interest so that if they do 
exceed the expected return, they are compensated at least as well as if they had received 
the straight carried interest.  Investors might have to offer VCs a higher percentage of the 
profits – say, 30% instead of 20% -- to get them to accept the true preferred return.  
If aligning deal flow incentives increases the likely total return by a sufficient amount, 
then investors should be willing to pay a higher percentage of carry, since aligning the 
incentives will nonetheless increase the net present value of their investment in the fund.  
104
 Risk aversion makes the optimal design difficult to figure out, even if deal flow incentives are the only 
goal and tax consequences are ignored.  Because VCs are risk averse, they will value the first dollars of 
carry that they receive more than the additional dollars, and thus may work harder to clear the hurdle and 
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Risk aversion complicates the analysis further.  Risk aversion will lead even VCs 
who are confident in their abilities to demand an additional risk premium if their 
compensation is subject to a true preferred return.  Even superbly talented VCs face 
uncertainties with any portfolio company, ups and downs in the market, and an exit 
strategy that depends in part on a vibrant IPO market.  Fund agreements limit the range of 
companies that VCs can invest in, making diversification difficult and increasing firm-
specific risk.  Investors might have to offer VCs an even higher percentage of the carry, 
perhaps 35%, in order to compensate the managers for the increased risk associated with 
the preferred return.  Nonetheless, the trade-off may be a good one if the investors need 
assurance that the managers they are hiring are competent.106
A formal model of optimal compensation design for risk averse venture capitalists 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  For present purposes, it is sufficient to recognize that 
because investors must compensate VCs for the increased risk associated with making a 
carry subject to a true preferred return, the preferred return is a somewhat costly device to 
screen talent and manage the agency cost problem.  For some funds, then, relying on 
reputation may be a more efficient solution.  Investors in prestigious funds can be 
confident that the VCs will have little trouble finding good deals and choosing the pick of 
the litter.  Because venture funds will want to preserve their reputation to aid in future 
fund raising efforts, investors can have some confidence that VCs with strong reputations 
will get them into the right investments.  Because the risk aversion of VCs makes a 
preferred return costly, we would expect to see it employed only when deal flow 
incentives are paramount.  The institutional quirks of the venture capital industry, with 
relatively small networks of entrepreneurs, VCs, and investors, create a plausible story 
that investors in funds with strong reputations have no need to employ a true preferred 
return.107
Deal flow incentives can thus help us understand why some venture capital funds 
might use a preferred return.  But the few VC funds that do employ a preferred return use 
a hurdle rate, not a true preferred return.  Why?  Recall that VCs will demand a risk 
premium in exchange for giving investors a preferred return.  A hurdle rate may be more 
efficient than a true preferred return if it properly aligns deal flow incentives but is less 
risky for VCs.  And a hurdle rate does help align deal flow incentives.  VCs who are not 
confident that they can clear 8% will value their compensation less, and will look for 
other work.  And a hurdle rate, like a true preferred return, encourages VCs to choose 
investments that in the aggregate will clear 8%.  
106 One recent model in the public company context finds that, after accounting for executive risk aversion 
and effort aversion, at-the-money or in-the-money options are optimal.  See Oded Palmon, Sasson Bar-
Yosef, Ren-Raw Chen & Itzhak Venezia, Optimal Strike Prices of Stock Options for Effort Averse 
Executives (draft available on ssrn).  The impact of risk aversion should not be overstated, however.  VCs 
also receive some compensation in the form of management fees, which are not contingent on the 
performance of the fund.  Because VCs receive some riskless return, the additional compensation in the 
form of carry may not be discounted for risk as steeply as one might think at first glance.
107 See Daniel Covitz & Nellie Liang, Recent Developments in the Private Equity Market and the Role of 
Preferred Returns (available on SSRN) (Jan. 2002 draft) at 17 (finding that preferred returns are more 
common at young firms, thus suggesting a screening effect).
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But a hurdle rate introduces a new distortion.  Imagine that a VC is considering 
three deals:  a low-risk, low-return company that will return $105 in one year on a $100 
investment, a medium-risk, medium-return company that has a 80% chance of returning 
$110, but has a 20% risk of returning $105, and a high risk, high-return company that has 
a 20% chance of returning $130, but has an 80% risk of returning $105.  A risk neutral 
investor would prefer the high-risk, high-return option, as it maximizes the expected 
return.  A hurdle rate, however, does not lead the VC to choose this option.108 The hurdle 
rate screens out the low-risk, low-return, option, but it allows the manager to receive its 
full share of carry on either the successful medium or high risk investment.  Because the 
catch-up provision allows the manager to gain its full share of carry as the return of the 
fund moves from 8-10 percent, the manager may concentrate on clearing the hurdle rather 
than maximizing total value.  VC risk aversion may magnify the distortion.  Assuming a 
declining marginal utility of wealth, the medium-risk, medium return strategy will be 
even more appealing than the high-risk, high-return strategy.109
A straight carried interest provides weaker deal flow incentives than a true 
preferred return or hurdle rate.  Risk-averse managers no longer have an incentive to 
reject even low-risk, low-return investment opportunities.  A sure thing that achieves a 
6% return will be attractive, even though this is not the sort of bet their investors have in 
mind.  This moral hazard risk should not be overstated:  one may address this concern in 
ways other than compensation design.  Venture capital fund agreements routinely limit 
by contract the sorts of companies that the fund may invest in.  For example, a fund may 
be limited to making investments in early-stage computer software companies.  While 
one might find both medium-risk and high-risk companies, one is not likely to find a low-
risk early-stage computer software company to invest in.  Thus, a straight carried interest
may be nearly as effective as a true preferred return in encouraging good investments.  A 
straight carried interest does have a significant weakness, however, when it comes to 
screening out bad VCs.  Few VCs are unable to achieve a positive return, and so few will 
be deterred by a compensation scheme that rewards performance even when that 
performance is subpar.
A capital interest in a partnership provides the weakest  deal flow incentives.  It 
provides no screening effect; even the worst VCs will not destroy the entire value of the 
fund.  Moreover, a capital interest in a partnership may encourage VCs to shy away from 
risky investments.  The compensation curve is upward sloping, so there is an incentive to 
108










 But the distortion caused by the catch-up zone may be less important in practice than it appears.  It 
would be difficult at the outset for VCs to distinguish between medium-risk and high-risk projects.  If a VC 
cannot distinguish between the two, then it will simply choose the best projects.  Moreover, the hurdle rate 
is calculated based on aggregate returns to date, so the strategy that maximizes net present value will also 
usually maximize the chances of clearing the hurdle.
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source and fund companies with a higher expected return.  Because VCs are risk averse, 
however, at the margins they may shy away from riskier investments.  
In sum, for funds where deal flow incentives are important, equity- based 
compensation should offer VCs no reward for investments that do not return at least the 
investors’ cost of capital.  A true preferred return achieves this goal.  A straight carried 
interest does not.  Reputation effects may mitigate some of the concerns about deal flow 
incentives. Opportunity costs may provide a substantial constraint on a VC’s choice of 
projects.  When an investor makes a capital commitment to a fund, the commitment is 
capped at a certain amount.  Thus, even a VC who has a capital interest in a partnership 
(and thus will make money from any investment) has an incentive to turn down deals if 
she is confident that better deals will come along within the funds’ investment time 
frame.  Opportunity costs are highest for VCs with better reputations, who have the 
strongest deal flow.110  Thus, providing strong deal flow incentives are most important for 
VCs who have the weakest deal flow and so might be more inclined to accept whatever 
deals they can find.   
3.  Deal Harvesting Incentives
The work of venture capitalists is not finished after they invest in portfolio 
companies.  VCs are active investors.  They often sit on the board of the portfolio 
companies, and sometimes even control the board.  Even without board control, VCs 
exert power over the portfolio companies by threatening to withhold financing for 
additional rounds of investment.  They provide entrepreneurs with management 
consulting advice, tap into their network of contacts to provide executive staffing, find 
relationships with customers, and aid in strategic planning.  
To encourage VCs to maximize the value of the portfolio companies, it may be 
important to give them both something to gain on the upside and something to lose on the 
downside.  The importance of upside is obvious:  if VCs earn more by increasing the 
value of the portfolio companies, they will work harder and will pay more attention to 
harvesting investing deals than to raising money for their next fund.  The importance of 
having something to lose on the downside is less obvious, but significant.  If VCs have 
nothing to lose, they may encourage portfolio companies to make risky bets.  VCs may 
do this by encouraging portfolio companies to go public before they are ready, to roll out 
products without sufficient testing, or to spend more money on marketing rather than 
R&D.  
This effect is not unique to the carried interest.  Any option-like compensation, 
including the common stock of a highly leveraged firm, shares this drawback.  When an 
option is out of the money, the holder has an incentive to take big risks with the 
company, even if such risky moves have a negative net present value.  
The problem may be more pronounced in VCs funds than in other contexts.  The 
value of venture funds is subject to a “J-curve” effect:  the value typically declines in the 
110
 I assume that VCs who have a strong reputation with investors also have a strong reputation among 
entrepreneurs seeking funding.
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early years of a fund, and then increases later.111 If the carry is far enough out of the 
money, the VC may simply give up on the fund, instead shifting attention to raising 
money for the next fund and letting the existing investments languish.  
A preferred return or hurdle rate exacerbates the out-of-the-money distortion.  
Because the strike price increases over time, VCs will face stronger and stronger 
incentives to make risky, negative net present value bets when offering advice to 
entrepreneurs.  
A hurdle rate introduces an additional inefficiency through the catch-up provision.  
Suppose a fund has one remaining portfolio company, Epsilon Corp.  The LPs originally 
contributed $100 to the fund and have received back, to date, $216.  The GP is right at 
the cusp of clearing the hurdle rate.  Now the fund is presented with an offer to sell its
Epsilon stock for $30; alternatively, it could hold on to the stock for another year.  If it 
holds on to the stock, there is a 25% chance Epsilon will go public and the stock would 
be sold for $180, and there is a 75% chance of failure, in which case they will receive 
nothing.  This should not be a close call.  The IPO play has a present value of $45; the 
sale would net $30.112  For the GP, though, incentives push it to sell.  Every dollar from 
the sale would be allocated to the GP; the LPs would receive nothing.  If Epsilon goes 
public, on the other hand, the first $54 would be allocated to the GP, and the remaining 
$126 would be split 80-20 in favor of the LPs, leaving the GP with an additional $21 and
a total of $75.  Given the 75% chance of failure, the present value of the IPO play, to the 
GP, is $19, far less than $30 from the sale.  The GP, then, might opt for the safer exit.  Of 
course, it is possible that this situation rarely comes up in the real world.  GPs, moreover, 
might enjoy more fund-raising value from a high profile IPO than a quiet sale, implicitly 
pushing up the value of the riskier strategy.  Still, the use of catch up provisions is 
puzzling from a governance perspective.113
The ready availability of alternatives makes the use of catch up provisions 
especially troubling.  Practitioners sometimes say that they do not want to “slow down” 
the carry beyond the 8% hurdle; a 100% catch up provision certainly speeds up the carry 
to 20% as quickly as possible.  Nonetheless, a tiered carry could accomplish much the 
same goal without distorting incentives as badly.114
A straight carried interest is somewhat more efficient than a preferred return with 
respect to deal harvesting incentives.  A straight carried interest will sometimes suffer 
from the same distortions that all option-like instruments share:  distorted incentives 
when the option is out of the money.  Because the straight carry has a lower strike price, 
however, it is less likely to fall out of the money, and less likely to be deep out of the 
money, when the distortion of incentives is the greatest concern.  
111 See Bartlett & Swan, supra note [xx].
112 [show calculations]. 
113
 A partial fix is to slow down the catch up provision by allocating 50% of profits to the GP rather than 
100% during the catch-up period.  This extends the distorted area of return on the graph, but better aligns 
incentives during the distortion.
114 For example, based on an initial investment of $100, the GP could receive 5% of profits from $100 to 
$150, 10% of profits from $150 to $200, 15% of profits from $200 to $250, and 20% of profits thereafter.  
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Does deal harvesting solve the puzzle of the missing preferred return?  Not quite.  
If the paramount goal of investors is to eliminate the possible bad incentives of an out of 
the money carry, the logical solution would be to lower the strike price, or to eliminate 
the option-like feature of the carry altogether.  One would do this by replacing the carried 
interest with a capital interest in the partnership.  A capital interest in the partnership 
eliminates the distortions of the carried interest.  Because VCs have something to lose on 
the downside and something to gain on the upside, incentives between VCs and investors 
are more closely aligned.  Risk-averse VCs, however, may act in too conservative a 
manner.  Investors concerned about risk aversion might consider increasing the amount 
of equity-based compensation as returns increase, for example, by giving VCs an 
additional 2% of the fund for every 10% increase in the IRR.  
4.  Summary
The relative efficiency of the carried interest vs. the preferred return depends 
largely on the reputation of the VCs.  If investors are confident that the VCs are talented 
and will secure good deal flow, then providing good deal harvesting incentives are most 
important.  The option-like characteristic of the carried interest is especially troublesome
when one adds in a preferred return.  A straight carried interest still distorts deal 
harvesting incentives, but not as frequently, and even less frequently for funds that have 
fewer strikeouts.  A capital interest aligns deal harvesting incentives best, and thus makes 
the most sense for high-quality, high-reputation VCs.  
If investors are less confident about the talent of the VC and its ability to secure 
good deal flow, then using a true preferred return may be optimal.  Bad managers will 
value this contingent compensation less than good managers, and will self-select away.  
Furthermore, managers will be more highly motivated to source high quality deals, 
knowing that their performance compensation depends on clearing the benchmark.  A 
hurdle rate also provides good screening effects, but introduces additional deal harvesting 
incentives.  
One would expect, then, to see a clientele effect.  For established institutional 
investors who can get into the most prestigious funds, one would expect VCs to receive a 
capital interest in the fund.  In less prestigious funds, on the other hand, one would expect 
VCs to receive a true preferred return.  And yet we see neither of these designs in the real 
world.  No funds that I know of give VCs a capital interest in the fund beyond the 
traditional one percent of the fund that VCs contribute.  When a carried interest is used, it 
is rarely (in VC) subject to a preferred return.  And when a preferred return is used, it is 
usually a hurdle rate rather than a true preferred return.
How can I explain this gap between my theoretical, agency costs-based
predictions and what we observe in the real world?  In the public company context, 
commentators have pointed to managerial power and accounting rules as the likely cause 
of inefficient contract design.  Here, accounting rules are irrelevant, and managerial 
power seems to be a less compelling story.  There is little reason to believe that agency 
costs would be absent in buyout funds, where preferred returns are used, but absent in 
venture, where they are not. What is left to explain the puzzle?  When optimal 
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contracting theory fails, solutions tend to fall into two categories:  market failures (such 
as monopolies or excessively high information costs), or legal or regulatory rules that 
dictate the suboptimal contract design.  Here, it is a set of legal rules – tax – that click s 
this Rubik’s Cube into place.  
V.  A Tax Explanation for the Missing Preferred Return 
Tax provides the final move to solve the puzzle.  Absent tax, one would expect to 
see either a true preferred return or capital interest, depending on the reputation of the 
VC.  For VCs with mixed or unknown reputations, one would expect to see a true 
preferred return.  VCs with high reputations should simply receive a capital interest in the 
partnership, which properly aligns deal harvesting incentives.  But we observe neither of 
these designs in the real world.  Arguably, a straight carried interest may represent a 
balancing act between deal flow incentives and deal harvesting incentives.  But 
incentives alone cannot account for the complete absence of VCs compensated with a 
capital interest.  Nor can incentives account for the nearly universal preference of hurdle 
rates over true preferred returns.  Either investors misunderstand how incentives work, or 
something else is going on.  Tax, ironically, helps bring the picture into focus. 
Tax distorts the contract design in two ways.  First, management fees are treated 
as ordinary income and taxed upon receipt.  Carry, on the other hand, is treated as capital 
gain and taxed at a lower rate.  Tax thus creates an incentive to pay as much 
compensation as possible in the form of carry rather than management fees.  Second, the 
value of the carry is not taxed upon receipt of the contract, but rather only when the 
underlying gains have been realized and distributed.  The option value of the carried 
interest is never taxed.  And so in two ways tax creates an incentive to pay as much 
compensation as possible in the form of carry and as little as possible in the form of 
management fees.  
The tax law thus subsidizes compensation for venture capitalists, but only when it 
comes in the form of carried interest.  The subsidy is especially valuable in venture 
capital because of the volatility of venture funds.  Including a preferred return in venture 
capital contracts (or, for that matter, indexing the carry to an industry benchmark or 
otherwise increasing firm-specific risk) would reduce the value of the carry, thereby 
failing to take full advantage of the subsidy.  The lawyers and principals who draft 
partnership agreements quite rationally take full advantage of the tax subsidy at the cost 
of somewhat inferior contract design.  
A.  The Tax Treatment of Carry
The tax law creates a gap between the economics of the carried interest and its 
treatment for tax purposes.  
1.  Timing
The first issue is timing.  At the moment a fund agreement is signed, the GP 
receives something of economic value.  The carried interest has an option value linked to 
the likelihood that the value of the fund will increase.  To be sure, the option value is 
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uncertain, contingent as it is on the efforts of the GP and subject to all sorts of external 
risks, such as the strength of the IPO market.  But it has some economic value 
nonetheless.  From a purely economic standpoint, then, the GP should recognize some 
amount of taxable income at the moment the partnership agreement is signed.  But the 
calculation of the option value would be very difficult to make, and even harder for the 
IRS to evaluate and police.  
Tax practitioners and academics have struggled for years over the problem of the 
taxation of the receipt of a partnership interest in exchange for services.115  Partnership 
interests are often analytically divided into two types: capital interests and profits 
interests.  A profits interest is an interest that gives the partner certain rights in the 
partnership (thus distinguishing it from an option to acquire a partnership interest) but 
that has no current liquidation value.  A capital interest both gives the partner certain 
rights in the partnership and also has a current liquidation value.  When a partner receives 
a capital interest in a partnership in exchange for services, the partner has immediate 
taxable income on the current value of the interest.116  Determining the proper treatment 
of a profits interest is more difficult, however, as its current economic value is difficult to 
determine.  In the 1974 case Diamond vs. Commissioner, the Tax Court (affirmed by the 
Seventh Circuit) surprised practitioners by holding that the receipt of a profits interest 
“with determinable market value” is taxable income.117
Prior to Diamond, most practitioners felt safe in advising clients that a receipt of a 
profits interest was not taxable.  Even after Diamond, practitioners could point to the fact 
that a profits interest in a partnership rarely has a determinable market value.  Some 
uncertainty remained, however, until 1993, when the IRS settled the issue by conceding 
that profits interests would not be taxed currently, and by further establishing that a 
partnership interest with no current liquidation value would be the hallmark of a profits 
interest.  In this pronouncement, Revenue Procedure 93-27, the IRS announced that the 
IRS would not treat the receipt of a profits interest by a person who performs services to 
a partnership in a partner capacity as a taxable event for the partner or the partnership.118
Rev. Proc. 93-27 spelled out the limits of this safe harbor.  To qualify, the profits 
interest must not relate to a substantially certain and predictable stream of income from 
partnership assets, such as income from high-quality debt securities or a high-quality net 
lease, must not be disposed of within two years of receipt, and the partnership must not 
be publicly traded.119  Rev. Proc. 93-27 defines a capital interest as an interest that would 
115 See, e.g., Martin B. Cowan, Receipt of an Interest in Partnership Profits in Consideration for Services: 
The Diamond Case, 27 TAX L. REV. 161 (1972); MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF 
PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, (3d ed. 1997) at ¶ 5.01-5.10; Laura E. Cunningham, Taxing Partnership 
Interests Exchanged for Services, 47 TAX L. REV. 247 (1991);  Schmolka, Taxing Partnership Interests 
Exchanged for Services: Let Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 TAX L. REV. 287 (1991).
116 See, e.g., Mark IV Pictures, Inc. v. Commissioner , 60 T.C.M. 1171, 1176 (1990); Larson v. 
Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. 1637 (1988); Hensel Phelps Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 74  T.C. 939 
(1980).  See also Treas. Reg.  §1.721-1(b)(1) and Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.721-1(b)(1)(i).
117 See Diamond v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 530 (1971), aff’d 492 F.2d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1974).
118 See Rev. Proc 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
119 See id.  See also Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191 (holding that a profits interest that is not 
substantially vested does trigger a taxable event when restrictions lapse; recipients need not file protective 
83(b) elections).
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give the holder a share of the proceeds if the partnership’s assets were sold at fair market 
value and then the proceeds were distributed in a complete liquidation of the 
partnership.120  A profits interest is defined as a partnership interest other than a capital 
interest.121  The determination as to whether an interest is a capital interest generally is 
made at the time of receipt of the partnership interest.122
The typical carried interest in a venture capital fund slips cleanly but snugly into 
the 93-27 safe harbor.  The interest has no current liquidation value; if the fund were 
liquidated immediately, all of the paid-in capital would be returned to the LPs.  And 
while the carried interest has value, it is not related to a “substantially certain and 
predictable stream of income from partnership assets.”  On the contrary, the amount of 
carry is highly uncertain and unpredictable.  
Rev. Proc. 93-27 draws an arbitrary line between capital interests and profits 
interests at whether the interest has a current liquidation value.  While the approach has 
some intuitive appeal and some administrative advantages, there is no economic 
distinction between a capital interest and a profits interest that would justify taxing them 
differently when issued to a partner in exchange for services rendered.123  By ignoring the 
option value of partnership interests with no current liquidation value, 93-27 allows 
partners to receive tax-deferred compensation.  Because options are more valuable when 
volatility increases, 93-27 is especially valuable for partnerships that make highly risky 
investments – like venture capital.  
The tax law thus sets up a significant timing benefit for venture capitalists by 
deferring tax on their compensation so long as the compensation is structured as a profits 
interest and not a capital interest in the partnership.124  But there is more than timing at 
issue:  tax also distorts the contract design by treating the carried interest as investment 
income rather than service income, and thus often allows the character of realized gains 
to be treated as capital gain rather than ordinary income.  
2.  Character
120 See Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
121 See id.
122 See id.
123 See Cunningham, supra note [xx]. at 252.
124
 The net result is also more advantageous than parallel rules for executive compensation with corporate 
stock.  See William R. Welke & Olga A. Loy, Compensating the Service Partner with Partnership Equity: 
Code § 83 and Other Issues, at 17 (“The treatment of SP’s receipt of a profits interest under Rev. Proc. 93-
27 is significantly better than the treatment of an employee’s receipt of corporate stock.  While the 
economics of a profits interest can be approximated in the corporate context by giving investors preferred 
stock for most of their invested capital and selling investors and the employee "cheap" common stock, the 
employee will recognize OI under Code §83 equal to the excess of common stock’s FMV (not liquidation 
value) over the amount paid for such stock.  In addition, if the common stock layer is too thin, there may be 
risk that value could be reallocated from the preferred stock to the  common stock, creating additional OI 
for the employee.  In contrast, in the partnership context, the fact that partners who provide capital are 
merely entitled to a return of their capital (but no yield) before SP shares in profits generally does not create 
an OI risk for SP.  Because the partners providing capital are entitled to a return of their capital before SP is 
entitled to anything, SP’s interest is still a profits interest with a zero liquidation value.”)  
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Compensation for services is normally treated as ordinary income.  Whether in 
the form of cash salary, a performance bonus, a trip to Bermuda or a Christmas ham – tax 
generally treats all such payments as ordinary income.125  In the partnership context, 
deciding whether a distribution is compensation for services or is a share of partnership 
income is a difficult issue when the recipient, like the GP here, is a partner in the 
partnership.  Section 83, enacted in 1969, addresses the receipt of property in exchange 
for services.  It provides the general rule that property received in connection with the 
performance of services is income.126  A simple reading of section 83, then, suggests that 
the GP should be taxed immediately on the option value of the carried interest, and 
because the carry is received in exchange for future services, the exchange would seem to 
give rise to ordinary income.  Section 707 further addresses payments from a partnership 
to a partner.  So long as the payment is made to the partner in its capacity as a partner 
(and not as an employee) and is determined by reference to the income of the partnership 
(i.e. is not guaranteed), then the payment will be respected as a payout of a distributable 
share of partnership income rather than salary.  Arguably, the initial receipt of the carried 
interest is better characterized as itself a guaranteed payment (as it is made before the 
partnership shows any profit or loss).127  However, Rev. Proc. 93-27 implicitly overrides 
this possible interpretation of sections 83 and 707.128  For tax purposes, then, the initial 
receipt of a profits interest is not a taxable event, and subsequent distributions will be 
respected as payouts of the distributable share of income.  
To determine the character of payments made pursuant to the carried interest, the 
tax law treats distributions of cash or securities under the terms of the carried interest as it 
would any other distributable share of income from a partnership.  Because partnerships 
are pass-through entities, the character of the income is preserved as it is received by the 
partnership and distributed to the partners.  Here, the distributable share of income is 
typically generated by the sale of stock in a portfolio company, which is normally capital 
gain.  Capital gain is taxed at a lower rate than ordinary income.129  Moreover, the venture 
fund’s investment in portfolio companies sometimes fit into the definition of “qualified 
small business stock,” reducing the tax rate even lower.130
The tax law thus carves a wide gap between the economics of the carried interest 
and its treatment for tax purposes.  The receipt of carry is economically valuable at the 
outset and is received in exchange for services rendered.  Under a pure economic concept 
125
 See IRC § 61.
126
 See IRC § 83(a).
127
 See Cunningham, 47 Tax. L. Rev. 247, 267 (“Because the value of a partnership interest received by a 
service partner, whether capital or profits, invariably is dependent upon the anticipated income of the 
partnership, the mere fact that the right to reversion of the capital has been stripped from the interest does 
not convert the property interest represented by the profits interest into a distributive share of partnership 
income.  Even though the value of a profits interest or capital interest cannot be determined without 
reference to partnership income, the property interest itself has a fixed value, and its transfer is a payment 
of a fixed amount (that is, a guaranteed payment), rather than a mere distributive share of partnership 
income.  Clearly, subsequent allocations of profits, either under the undivided capital interest or under the 
bare profits interest, are distributive shares not subject to § 707, although the one time transfer of the 
interest itself is.”)  
128
 Cite to 707(a) and 707(c) and explain more.
129
 See § 1(h).
130
 See §§ 1202, 1045.
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of income, the GP should pay tax upon receipt of the interest, take a basis in the carry, 
and recognize further income or loss as the partnership makes or loses money.  Instead, 
the tax law allows the GP to defer tax by treating the initial receipt of carry as a nonevent 
for tax purposes, and then allows the GP to treat the receipt of distributions as capital 
gains rather than as ordinary income, notwithstanding the fact that the distributions are 
related to the GP’s performance of services for the partnership.131
Sophisticated readers may note that I have left out a significant piece of the tax 
analysis:  the treatment of the partnership (and thus the impact of these rules on the other 
partners).  In general, treating the receipt of a profits interest by the GP as a nonevent for 
tax purposes is good for the GP but bad for the LPs, as the partnership may not take a 
deduction for the value of the interest paid to the GP, and the LPs lose the benefit of that 
deduction.  If the GP and LPs have the same marginal rates, then the tax benefit to the GP 
of Rev. Proc. 93-27 would be perfectly offset by the tax detriment to the LPs.  In fact, 
GPs not only typically have a higher marginal rate than LPs; a majority of LPs are tax-
exempt and have a marginal rate of zero.
Rev. Proc. 93-27 is thus especially important in this context because the majority 
of LPs are not harmed by the loss of the tax deduction.  Over 50% of investors in venture 
capital are tax-exempt pension funds, and other investors, such as private foundations, 
university endowments, and others are tax-exempt or have lower rates.  Thus, by taking 
full advantage of 93-27, tax planners are not merely redistributing value between the GP 
and the LP, they are creating value for the parties by shifting value away from the public 
fisc.  Subject only to the limitation of the distorting effect on contract design, it becomes 
rational for fund lawyers to take full advantage of the gap between the economics of the 
carried interest and its treatment for tax purposes.132
B.  The Impact of Tax on Carried Interest Design
The tax law thus provides a powerful incentive that affects the design of venture 
capital compensation.  By drawing a sharp distinction between a capital interest in a 
partnership and a profits interest in a partnership, LPs should strive to pay GP with a 
profits interest so long as doing so does not unduly distort incentives.  Further, to the 
extent that the carried interest is a substitute for other forms of compensation, LPs should 
strive to pay as much as possible in the form of carry and as little as possible in the form 
of cash salary.  
Venture funds do exactly this.  By starting the carry at nominal profits of zero, 
venture funds maximize the amount of compensation paid in the form of carried interest, 
which maximizes the amount of compensation deferred by the GP.  If the fund employs a 
preferred return, starting the carry at a higher threshold, then the fund is not maximizing 
131
 It’s less clear what happens with an in-the-money carried interest.  Outside the safe harbor of 93-27, it’s 
possible that a carried interest that was $1 in the money would trigger immediate tax on the full amount.  
Levin argues, however, that “a far more rational reading is that the IRS intends that the taxpayer-favorable 
[liquidation value] rule not be available only to the extent the service provider’s partnership interest is in 
the money at receipt[.]”  Levin, supra note xx, at 10-17.
132
 Given that a structure that maximizes benefits for both the GPs and a majority of LPs is probably best for 
all; for this and other reasons taxable LPs gravitate away from venture capital, creating a clientele effect.
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the amount of compensation paid in the most tax-efficient form.  If, in response to the 
imposition of a preferred return, the GP demands a higher management fee, that 
management fee would be taxed upon receipt, and would be treated as ordinary income 
rather than as capital gains.133
The option analogy may again be useful.  The tax law provides a strong incentive 
to pay partnership executives with an option-like instrument rather than a forward-like 
instrument.  It also provides an incentive to establish the strike price of the option as low 
as possible without putting the option in the money (which in turn would give the option 
a current liquidation value and upset the tax treatment).  By excluding a preferred return, 
the fund sets the strike price at the money.  By keeping the strike price fixed rather than 
increasing it over time, it further maximizes the option value of the carried interest.  
Moving the strike price any higher would lead to other compensation paid in less tax-
favorable form; moving the initial strike price any lower would create immediate tax 
liability to the GP. 
To frame the problem in a slightly different way, consider the design of 
compensation from a tax point of view, ignoring incentive effects.  To minimize taxes, 
the GP should receive as much compensation as possible in the form of capital gains, and 
should pay tax on that compensation as late as possible.  A tax-efficient scheme, then, 
would consist entirely of a profits interest in the partnership, and no management fee 
whatsoever.  
The real world makes this difficult, however, as investment professionals do need 
steady income to pay fund expenses, receive some salary to make mortgage payments, 
car payments, and to live in the manner in which they have become accustomed.  In 
theory, GPs could borrow this amount from outside lenders using the carried interest as 
collateral, but information costs make such borrowings expensive.  
The next best solution, then, is to keep management fees low and maximize the 
carried interest.  In designing the carried interest, moreover, one would want to include 
both firm-specific and non-firm-specific risk, as VCs would have difficulty hedging away 
firm-specific risk.  By excluding the preferred return and not indexing the carried interest, 
that is exactly what venture funds do.  A preferred return would move the strike price of 
the option out of the money.  Indexing the carry to an industry benchmark would amplify 
firm-specific risk, reducing the value of the carry.  In the other direction, setting the strike 
price of the option in the money would give it a current liquidation value, thus upsetting 
the favorable tax treatment.  Although perhaps not consciously, the market for GP 
compensation has found its way to the most tax-efficient result.  
C.  Turning the puzzle around
133
 Levin reports that some GPs opt to reduce their management fee in exchange for a higher profits interest, 
either up front (as I suggest here) or by reserving the right to periodically waive the fee in exchange for an 
enhanced profits interest.  See Levin, Structuring Venture Capital, supra note xx, at 10-13.  So long as there 
is some economic risk that further fund appreciation will not occur, periodic waivers will successfully 
convert OI into LTCG.  See id.  
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The tax explanation for the absence of a preferred return in venture capital 
contracts helps solve one puzzle but creates another.  If the tax incentive to pay 
compensation in the form of carried interest is so powerful, then why don’t buyout funds 
and other private equity funds follow suit?  Tax has turned our puzzle inside out: venture 
funds start the carry on a first dollar basis to pay as much compensation as possible in a 
tax-advantaged form.  The new challenge is to figure out why buyout funds and other 
private equity funds include a preferred return.  Why are preferred returns used at all?  I 
focus on two reasons: reputation and investment strategy.  
The first reason is simple:  deal flow incentives may be more important in  some 
funds.  Even some VC funds use preferred returns, and it appears that preferred returns 
became more common in venture funds as the size of the market grew, presumably 
introducing more VCs of unknown reputation.  Preferred returns may be more common 
in buyout funds in part because it is difficult to know or rely on the reputation of buyout 
managers than VCs.  Buyout firms tend to be larger than VC firms, so perhaps investors 
can be less confident that the managers they know will end up directing their 
investments.  
But the near uniformity of the preferred return in buyout suggests that there must 
be more.  The second reason a preferred return is used is institutional:  outside of the 
venture context, the preferred return also protects private equity investors against a moral 
hazard risk.  Specifically, in the absence of a preferred return, the manager of a buyout 
fund might choose a low-risk, low-return strategy.  
The strategy of many buyout funds is to take stodgy, underperforming companies 
and turn them into streamlined high-performance firms.  Buyout funds might do this by 
replacing management, changing corporate strategy, or breaking the company up and 
selling it off in pieces.  And so a company that generated an annual return to stockholders 
of 5% a year might be transformed into a company that generates, for the buyout fund, a 
return of 20% or more.  The carried interest gives buyout fund managers a financial 
incentive to pursue this strategy by giving them a share of the upside.  
Without a preferred return, however, the fund manager’s incentives may be 
distorted.  After all, if the fund invests in a company that returns 5% a year, the fund 
manager still enjoys 1% -- 20% of the 5% -- in the form of carried interest.  The fund 
manager may choose to pursue a low-risk, low-return strategy either by changing very 
little about the company after the investment is made, or even by choosing companies 
that have very little potential to generate large returns, but might be safer investments.  
Consider, simply for illustrative purposes, a hedge fund that starts with $1 billion 
in capital and a ten-year life.  Suppose the GP receives a straight carry under the terms of 
the partnership agreement, just as in a venture capital fund.  A sensible strategy for the 
GP would be to take the $1 billion in partnership capital and buy ten year Treasury notes, 
thus virtually guaranteeing a 6% return over the next ten years.  Each year, the GP will 
receive 1.2% of the return (20% of the 6%), or $12 million dollars, for doing virtually no 
work and costing itself nothing beyond its reputation and ability to raise future funds. In 
the hedge fund context, it’s not likely that this simplistic approach would work.  Investors 
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would observe the investment in Treasury Notes and withdraw their capital.  And the 
hedge fund manager’s reputation would suffer greatly.  
In the buyout context, however, it may be more difficult for investors to observe 
what the fund managers are doing.  While they will normally be able to find out the 
identity of each portfolio company and the broad plans for reorganization of the 
company, the difference between a stodgy company and a stodgy company with great 
potential is highly subjective.  And, unlike in the hedge fund example, the investors’ 
capital is locked in.  Because fund managers could easily hide a low-risk, low-return 
strategy, include a preferred return is important to aligning incentives, notwithstanding 
the tax cost.  
Reputational costs might constrain the fund manager’s decision to take the easy 
way out, but the difference in investment decisions might be more subtle than in this 
stylized example, making it difficult and expensive for future investors to recognize the 
self-interested decision-making.  A preferred return solves this moral hazard concern by 
rewarding the fund manager only for investments that include enough upside potential to 
clear the hurdle.  
GPs can also lower the riskiness of the portfolio by choosing diverse portfolio 
companies, and investing smaller amounts in more deals, than investors would like.134 A 
recent paper by Douglas Cumming and others documents the moral hazard risk, which 
they call “style drift.”135 While some style drift concerns may be addressed by contract, it 
is expensive for LPs to draft and to monitor compliance with these terms.  GPs are in a 
better position than LPs to understand the portfolio company business plans.  And so 
addressing this agency cost indirectly through a preferred return may be more efficient –
notwithstanding the tax inefficiency – than using a straight carried interest and trying to 
monitor more closely what the GPs are doing.
For venture funds, the moral hazard risk of taking a low-risk strategy is smaller 
than in buyout funds, as venture fund managers rarely find investments that are safe and 
low risk.  The terms of the limited partnership fund agreements typically require the fund 
managers to invest only in start-up companies or growth companies in certain carefully 
defined industries.  Reputational constraints are stronger as well, as it is easy for investors 
to see the difference between a start-up and an established company, while it may be 
more difficult to distinguish a safe mature company from a riskier one.  
In the end, these institutional differences between venture funds and buyout 
funds, along with the tax incentive to maximize equity-based compensation, explain the 
missing preferred return.  It’s difficult for buyout fund investors to monitor what buyout 
fund managers are investing in, and there’s an unacceptable risk that absent a hurdle rate, 
134
 The moral hazard concern is present even when the choice is between two investments of roughly 
equivalent net present value.  Institutional investors treat private equity as an “alternative asset class,” 
meaning that it is valued in large part for its diversification effect.  Using a preferred return ensures that 
private equity managers, given a choice, will never choose an investment with a likely return below 8%.  
The preferred return, in other words, protects the diversification effect of private equity.
135 See Douglas Cumming et al., Style Drift in Private Equity, available on ssrn.com, May 30, 2004 version, 
at 4.
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buyout fund managers will choose a low-risk, low-return strategy, at least on the margins.  
Venture is different.  It’s not that VCs are saints.  But there’s no such thing as a low-risk, 
low-return high tech start-up.  And so taking full advantage of the tax treatment of a 
profits interest in a partnership makes sense.
VI.  Conclusion
Tax distorts the design of venture capital compensation by encouraging the use of 
risky, equity-linked compensation over management fees.  Because the tax treatment is 
more favorable than the economic reality, the tax law can be viewed as subsidizing VCs.  
Because the market for investors is somewhat competitive, the subsidy is likely split 
between the VCs and their investors.  And so it is more accurate to say that the tax law 
subsidizes venture capital investing, not just VCs.  The normative implications are not 
obvious.  
In general, a gap between the tax treatment of a transaction and its economic 
treatment is troubling from a policy perspective.  Gaps create deadweight loss by 
distorting the behavior of participants.  Here, VCs may be engaging in riskier strategies 
than their investors would prefer, rushing products to market and pushing management to 
pursue IPO exits.  Notwithstanding this potential negative externality, the status quo may 
be acceptable from a policy perspective for two reasons.  First, the solution may be worse 
than the problem.  Changing the tax law would give rise to enormous uncertainty and 
administrative headaches for practitioners and the IRS alike.  Second, a tax subsidy for 
venture capital may be a worthwhile expenditure of public resources.  Although a full 
blown defense of subsidizing venture capital is beyond the scope of this article, a short 
explanation may be useful.  
Pragmatism provides the first reason to keep the status quo.  Current law may be 
the inevitable product of administrative concerns.  The tax law fails to recognize and tax 
the option value of the carried interest because it would be extremely difficult to 
calculate.  Unlike publicly traded options that can be valued using Black-Scholes or other 
models developed by economists, the value of the carried interest depends on the efforts 
of the GP.  There is no option value except what the GP creates.  Because LPs use the 
profits interest to motivate the GP, the GP cannot sell its profits interest.  It’s a vastly 
different situation than receiving marketable options on a publicly traded stock.  And so 
agreeing on the value of a profits interest in a partnership is no easy task, and the 
administrative headaches would consume large amounts of IRS resources.  
Moreover, fund advisors could react to a change in the tax law by replacing the 
carried interest with a financial equivalent:  an option to acquire a capital interest in a 
partnership.  An option to acquire a 20% capital interest in the partnership with a strike 
price set at 20% of the initial fund value is financially equivalent to and provides the 
same incentives as the usual 20% carry.  Under current law, the issuance of an option to a 
service provider generally is not treated as a taxable property transfer under section 83,136
136
 See section 83(e)(3); Treas. Reg. section 1.83-3(a)(2); 
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although what happens on exercise is less clear.137  Changing the rules on the treatment of 
a profits interest in a partnership would just move the battleground to a different, 
financially equivalent arena.
Economic growth provides the second reason to keep the status quo.  Subsidizing 
venture capital may be a good idea.  Venture capital-backed start-ups create jobs.  And 
unlike other small businesses like restaurants, dry cleaners or hotels, these start-ups create 
new technologies and fuel expanding market sectors.  The whole point of venture capital 
is to grow small businesses into large ones, and when these businesses become large, the 
jobs they offer are of a higher quality, and may be less likely to be outsourced, then jobs 
created by large firms.  While I recognize that much more needs to be said to justify a tax 
subsidy for venture capital, there is at least reason to think that a knee-jerk reaction to 
change the treatment of a profits interest in a partnership may not be wise.
Tax can have a powerful impact on contract design, even in an area like venture 
capital where deal structures are not thought to be tax-driven.  Ron Gilson and David 
Schizer have argued that tax drives the basic deal structure at the portfolio company 
level, leading VC funds to use convertible preferred stock.138 Like Gilson & Schizer, I 
believe delving into the tax plumbing of deals is a worthwhile endeavor.  Here, I have 
argued that reputation and institutional differences between buyout funds and venture 
funds are the primary drivers of deal structure, but I have also argued that tax almost 
certainly changes decisions at the margins.  Without tax, we could expect to see more 
variety in VC fund agreements:  we would see both more preferred returns (for low 
reputation VCs) and also some “in-the-money” carried interests or even capital interests
(for high reputation VCs).  
137
 See NYSBA Tax Section, Taxation of Partnership Options and Convertible Securities, Tax Notes, 
(March 4, 2002) 1179, 1201-03.
138 See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation 
for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 875 (2003).
